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First Results #1

Primary interpretation of survey findings to identify national citizen security cultures

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The CPSI Project

CPSI – Changing Perceptions on Security and Interventions – is a multinational research project funded by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union, under the 1st Security Research Call (thematic area "Security and Society") – Call Identifier FP7-SEC-2007-1, Grant Agreement No. 217881.

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The CPSI consortium is formed by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research TNO (NL) (leader) the WWEDU Center for European Security Studies (AT), the Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI (SE), the University of Kent (UK), Sogeti Europe (FR), TEMIS SA (FR), the European Commission – Joint Research Centre, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IT) and Social and Cultural Planning Office (NL).

The WWEDU Center for European Security studies is responsible for dissemination of CPSI work. In this context it is publishing, within its paper series *Analytical Standpoint*, selected first results of ongoing CPSI analyses documenting consolidation of and early steps beyond state of the art in security risk perception and fear of crime research.

The overall goal of the CPSI project is to provide governments and related organizations with a methodology to increase insight into the determinants of actual and perceived security (exemplified in terms of fear of crime), and into which interventions are effective for increasing security. The deliverables of this project represent practical and ready-to-use tools, which can be employed by policy makers and other end-users to formulate policy regarding security. In this project we will develop 1) a conceptual model of actual and perceived security and their determinants, 2) a methodology to collect, quantify, organize, analyze and interpret security-related data, 3) a data warehouse to store and extract for analysis data amassed using the methodology, and 4) carry out a validation study to test the model, methodology and data warehouse. We will try to answer relevant security-related questions from the field using the methodology. The project deliverables can be used by end-users to assess security at the international, national and local levels and to draw conclusions regarding such issues, such as: What are the levels of actual and perceived security in specific locations?, Which interventions work where?, and Which interventions should be implemented in which locations?

This first interpretation of survey findings to identify national citizen security/fear of crime cultures is a first step in the development of more extensive country case studies. CPSI country case studies work also includes analysis of national security (research) cultures that will be reported in the upcoming *Analytical Standpoint* no. 13 (December 2008). The present selection of nations reflects the general CPSI country case study scheme based on countries represented in CPSI's End-user Advisory Group.

First results on fear of crime culture on comparative perspective

This present CPSI first results paper is based on two opinion poll/crime statistics secondary analysis reported in two survey and statistical data documents, available in the annex of this *Analytical Standpoint*, containing

additional data, hypothesis and interpretations about sources of citizens' fear of crime, feelings of personal/social (in)security and attitudes towards crime-reducing public intervention, including security technologies:

- “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions. A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”
- “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level” (especially qualitative summary of findings in table and text on pp. 31-36).

These two data documents also contain, as our contribution beyond the current state of empirical analysis in citizen perceptions of (in)security and interventions, hypothesis and evidence for or against them as basis for further research in the course of the CPSI project. The typological categories – like “social overfear” culture – are developed in the second part of the attached statistical document, titled “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security” (pp. 31-32).

Austria

Austria has a low victimization and personal fear of crime level but the social fear of crime level is relatively high compared to the actual level of victimization. Reflecting this social overfear of crime, public debates tend to centre on perceived rather than actual security. Nevertheless, citizen security culture² can in sum be described as marked by realistic fear of crime. This may also be due to policy interventions being typically based on actual security rather than moral panic. In fact, crime as a concern for Austrian citizens has dropped by 46 per cent from 2003 to 2007, which is greatly above the EU average drop of 14 per cent.³ In sum, this reproduces the finding of Special EUROBAROMETER 181

2 The typology of citizen security culture presented here is developed in the annexed data document “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level”. The typology is based on three indicators: (1) Personal fear in relation to actual victimization level, (2) social fear in relation to actual victimization level and (3) perception of crime as a prior problem in relation to actual crime rate. Personal fear, social fear, victimization, crime rate and perception of crime as a prior problem are measured in figures from relevant survey data as documented in the annexed data/analytical sheet “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security. Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level”.

3 Annex 1: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions. A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”, table 1.

(2003)⁴ that Austrian citizens have a strong perception of relative safety. Citizens have under-average concern about crime on a national level, along with a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. At the same time, interestingly, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.⁵ Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is low, and technology is by the public more seen as a threat (or part of the problem) than a part of the solution.

Bulgaria

According to police recording, Bulgaria has an under-average to average victimization level, with average social fear but high personal fear of crime. Still, public debates centre on actual security as represented by reported offences, whereas policy interventions seem to be rather based on perceived security and perceived relevance of issues in the political arena. The resulting lack of responsiveness to citizen (actual) fear of crime may be part of the explanation for the personal overfear present in Bulgaria. It may also explain the only slight fall (by 8%) that crime has seen from 2003-2007 as a perceived area of concern by citizens.⁶ Citizens however have EU-average concern about crime and a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting.

France

Victimization being relatively low but personal and social fear of crime being average, France has a citizen security culture of overfear. Whereas public debates typically centre on actual security, public interventions tend to focus on (in)security as perceived in the political arena. This is comparable to the situation in Bulgaria, which also has an overfear culture, so that public policy centred on perceived security, tending to be irresponsive to citizens' needs based on actual security, can again be assumed to be part of the explanation for citizens' overfear of crime. Overfear may also account for French citizens being split in their preference for EU-based as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. The EU is a locus of fear of crime for some citizens in France.⁷ Nevertheless, crime as a citizen concern has constantly

4 "Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime", *Special EUROBAROMETER 181* (2003): http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_181_en.pdf.

5 Annex 1: "Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions", table 5.

6 Ibid., table 1.

7 Ibid., tables 6 and 7.

been decreasing, considerably more (43%) than EU average (14%) in the 2003-2007 period.⁸ It is now clearly below EU average. Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is low, and technology is by the public more seen as a threat (or part of the problem) than a part of the solution.

Germany

With an average level of victimization but equally low levels of personal and social fear of crime, Germany has an underfear citizen security culture. Public debates and policy interventions tend to centre more on perceived than on actual security. Nevertheless, crime as a citizen concern has dropped 17 per cent from 2003 to 2007, which is about EU average. Citizens have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting although there is a tendency to perceive the EU as a cause of crime⁹. At the same time, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.¹⁰ Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by Closed Circuit Television, or CCTV, surveillance) is average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

Italy

With personal overfear and social underfear in face of average victimization, Italy in sum comes close to a citizen culture of realistic fear of crime. It is however, together with Bulgaria, one of the only two countries of all countries studied here in which personal fear of crime clearly outnumbers social fear of crime. In this respect, the Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding that Italy is a high-fear of crime country could be reproduced. In fact, Italy is the only of the countries under analysis here that has witnessed and increase (by 18%) in crime as a citizen concern over the 2003-2007 period, whereas EU average is a decrease by 14 per cent. Citizens have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. Accordingly, they perceive EU interventions to be more suitable to enhance their security against crime than national interventions. In fact, Italy is the only of the countries under review for which statistical analysis of EUROBAROMETER data clearly suggests a citizen preference for European solutions to national crime problems.¹¹ This may also be due to the fact that citizens' perception of the EU meaning more crime is farthest below EU average of all countries

8 Ibid., table 1.

9 Ibid., tables 6 and 7.

10 Ibid., table 5.

11 Ibid., tables 3 and 4.

analyzed.¹² Data for all other countries suggest that citizens, even when in favour of EU decision-making and action in crime fighting, in general still prefer national solutions for specifically national security problems. Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is above average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

Netherlands

Over-average victimization along with personal underfear and social overfear make the Netherlands in sum a country that has a balanced citizen fear of crime culture, but the social fear character of the security culture remains important, with technology rather perceived as associated with security problems than with solutions to security problems. For citizens personally, crime as an issue of concern has considerably dropped (by 36%) in the 2003-2007 period, which is considerably more than the EU average (decrease by 14%). This is in keeping with the EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding that the Dutch have a strong perception of relative safety. Citizens also have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. At the same time however, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.¹³ Technology is more perceived as part of the problem (posing security threats or being vulnerable against security threats) than part of the solution.

Sweden

Having average victimization but clear over-average crime reporting as compared to the other countries analysed here, the Swedish citizen security culture seems to be unbalanced: Clear below-average personal fear of crime goes together with clear over-average social fear of crime. The result can be seen in a decrease of crime as a citizen concern by moderate 9 per cent in the 2003-2007 period, the EU average being 14 per cent. At the same time, citizens much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.¹⁴ This not entirely reproduces the finding of Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) that Swedish citizens have a strong perception of relative safety. Citizens' preference for EU or national decision-making and action in crime fighting is fickle but the balance has recently been by 10 percentage points in favour of the EU. Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is above average, with technology

12 Ibid., table 5.

13 Ibid., table 5.

14 Ibid., table 5.

generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

United Kingdom

The UK – based on the data for England and Wales – has a balanced personal/social fear culture that can be described as an underfear citizen security culture: victimization being high, personal and social fear levels are average. Therefore, the Special Eurobarometer 181 (2003) finding that the UK is a high fear of crime country could not be reproduced. The decrease of crime as a citizen concern is some moderate 8 per cent in the 2003-2007 period, the EU average being 14 per cent. This fact may account for the citizens' clear preference for national decision-making and action in crime fighting. The EU can be assumed a locus of citizen fear of crime.¹⁵ However, citizens' perception of the EU meaning more crime is below EU average.¹⁶ Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (as exemplified by CCTV) is high, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

Summary and assumptions for further CPSI research

High social fear of crime countries (crime perceived as a problem “out there”, such as prominent in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden) have under-average personal fear of crime but an over-average number of offences reported to police, indicating low actual security. Personal fear of crime in this type of countries is also lower than the victimization level would suggest.

High personal fear of crime countries (crime perceived as an individual(ized) issue, such as prominent in Bulgaria and Italy) can still have average victimization levels. They have however an under-average number of offences reported to police (high actual security) and average or under-average social fear of crime. Personal fear of crime is thus more detached from actual security than social fear of crime. More social fear of crime is associated with less personal fear of crime. This leads to the hypothesis that social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime.

The EU generally does not seem to be a source of citizen fear of crime in their own country; France, Germany and the UK appear to be exceptions. At the same time, citizens perceive national interventions to be most suitable to enhance their security against crime; the exception is Italy, where citizens

15 Ibid., table 6.

16 Ibid., table 5.

appear to prefer EU solutions also to national security problems. For the UK, statistical analysis, while supporting no strong interpretation, points to a possible interpretation in a similar direction.

Despite public support for EU decision-making and action against crime, the EU itself is generally not perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime; the exception is Italy. For the UK again, statistical analysis, while supporting no strong interpretation, points to a possible interpretation in a similar direction.

CPSI country analysis so far has shown *no* consistent association between acceptance of technological solutions for security problems (such as CCTV) and relationship between level of societal and of personal fear of crime, level of victimization, relationship between felt and actual personal/social security and victimization.

CPSI country analysis however has shown consistent association between acceptance of CCTV and cultural attitudes towards technology: Countries in which technology is interpreted as part of the security problem (e.g. critical infrastructure protection, information technology as object of offence and source of insecurity), public CCTV acceptance is lower than in countries where technology is interpreted as part of the solution (e.g. information technology as a foundation for coordinated, efficient prevention and response).

Summary of changes (incl. annexes)

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<http://analysestandpunkt.european-security.info>

ANNEXES

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ANNEX 1

Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions

A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis

Context of the present EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis

In recent criminological studies, fear of crime usually is investigated in a more differentiated way only on the level of the population of selected European capitals, and accordingly operationalized by items related to urban-area security.¹ Moreover, most criminological research is at least 3-4 years time-lagged and does not cover public belief in effectiveness of interventions. As it belongs to CPSI's approach to include citizens' perceptions of interventions and to generate hypothesis on a general level and then test them in own from-scratch case studies, the available criminological public opinion research is of limited use for this scope of the project. Nevertheless, there are a couple of criminological resources that offer relevant data for analyzing fear of crime in comparative terms on a national level. These data are collected, analyzed and testable hypothesis developed in the WWEDU-CESS informal deliverable "Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security".

However, in order to generate hypothesis for further research by an inductive methodology, desk research on the basis of the relevant items of the Standard EUROBAROMETER has proven useful to develop, on national levels, hypotheses about associations between factors believed to impact fear of crime and to establish an empirically sound foundation for both cross-country and cross-time comparison. These comparisons will also be based on country case studies currently under development – using, among other things, criminological and general survey research data as empirical indicators for cultural dispositions of a society.

1 See annex 2: "Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security".

Methodology

This paper presents a secondary analysis of relevant Standard EUROBAROMETER opinion poll data from the CPSI case study countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), compared to the EU average (EU-15/EU-25/EU-27 as applicable). Crime as a national and a European concern of EU citizens is followed over the past five years (2003-2007), on the basis of poll data provided by the respective autumn EUROBAROMETER surveys.²

“Crime” is understood here as domestic crime with a focus on neighbourhood safety, and EUROBAROMETER items were picked accordingly. Timeline comparison is limited by the fact that not all relevant items are reflected in each EUROBAROMETER. Specific information on this analytical constraint is provided with each of the following tables. Each table will also be interpreted in the qualitative country case studies under preparation by WWEDU-CESS.

On the basis of r correlations, hypotheses about sources of citizens’ fear of crime of citizens of the seven focus countries are developed and cross-checked for plausibility.

This paper first investigates crime as a concern of citizens on the national level and compares these data with citizens’ preferences for a national vs. European locus of decision-making and action in crime fighting. This is done to check initial evidence of the following hypothesis on predictors for success of interventions:

“Success of interventions to increase felt security/reduce citizens’ fear of crime is bigger when the interventions happen on the national (as opposed to the European) level.”

EU citizens’ fear of crime could also come from the European level itself, e.g. reflecting the border control problem. It is assessed whether European Union means more crime to citizens and how this perception has evolved over time. To gain initial evidence of the hypothesis

“The EU is locus of citizens’ fear of crime in their own country”,

perception of crime as a problem on the national level is compared with the perception that the European Union means more crime (this item has unfortunately not anymore been included into EUROBAROMETER since 2006). Crime as a concern of citizens on

2 *Standard Eurobarometer 60*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb60/eb60_en.htm; *Standard Eurobarometer 62*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm; *Standard Eurobarometer 64*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htm; *Standard Eurobarometer 66*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.htm; *Standard Eurobarometer 68*, poll period (fieldwork) autumn 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_en.htm. Data are taken from the respective full report and, where necessary, its annexes.

the EU level is then checked for association with citizens' favour of national decision-making, which in case of a positive association would support the EU locus of fear of crime hypothesis.

In tables 3, 4, 6 and 7, correlation values are presented together with tentative interpretation providing evidence for or against the hypothesis stated in the headline of the respective table.

Special EUROBAROMETER baseline results

There have only been two relevant Special EUROBAROMETERs. The first is *Europeans and Public Security* (1996)³ (based on a selection of items from the International Crime Victims Survey – ICVS – 1996), on the eve of the establishment of the Area of Justice, Liberty and Security in the EU Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which is too long a time distance to be included in the present secondary analysis. However, this Special EUROBAROMETER contains relevant hypothetical conclusions about sources citizens' fear of crime, focused on street crime,⁴ which can be the basis of further CPSI work, forming a baseline that results of theoretical work and newer results of empirical work can be checked against. They are listed in the following and as far as possible assessed by results of own research:

- The variation in national rates of fear reflects that of actual victimization by violent crime. This hypothesis is **refuted** by statistical and qualitative analysis of criminological survey data from 2003-2005.⁵
- High levels of fear of street crime seem to be a characteristic for countries in transition (Eastern Europe).
- Fear of crime is positively related to urbanization. This could however be an **artefact** as fear of crime is typically operationalized by survey items referring to urban scenarios (“feeling fear when walking in dark” and others) and the Special Eurobarometer uses data from the International Crime Victims Survey – ICVS –,⁶ which carries that urban bias.
- Fear of street crime is indicative of higher exposure to actual violence. This would, in inversion of the argument, mean that citizens' perception of “street security” is not much disrupted from actual “street security” and may further suggest that self-

3 J.J.M. van Dijk/L.G. Toornvliet: *Towards a Eurobarometer of public safety. Key findings of the first survey on public safety among the residents of the European Union. Report presented at the Seminar on the Prevention of Urban Delinquency linked to Drugs Dependence*. European Commission, 21-22 November Brussels. [Registered as *Special EUROBAROMETER 100* on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_en.htm], http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_100_en.pdf.

4 Ibid., p. 9-10.

5 See annex 2: “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security”.

6 <http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs>; Result report: J.J.M. Van Dijk/J.N. van Kesteren/P. Smit: *Criminal Victimization in International Perspective: Key Findings from the 2004-2005 ICVS and EU ICS*. The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers, 2008 <http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs/pdf/files/ICVS2004_05.pdf>.

experienced exposure to violence does not increase fear of crime but attaches it to the level of actual security. This **contradicts** criminological survey research and hypothesis developed from secondary analysis of this survey research.⁷

- Social vulnerability is a good predictor of fear of street crime (vulnerability-factor hypothesis). This kind of vulnerability results from exposure to actual violence in combination with limited resources to deal with the economic consequences of victimization. This is **reinforced** by Special EUROBAROMETER 181 findings cited below.
- Older citizens more often feel unsafe in their own area. This can be seen as attaching positive evidence to the vulnerability-factor hypothesis. This is **reinforced** by Special EUROBAROMETER 181 findings cited below.
- Europeans with lower incomes tend to feel less safe in their neighbourhoods.
- The factor most strongly related to fear of street crime is gender. This is **reinforced** by Special EUROBAROMETER 181 findings cited below. This result is surprising because actual victimisation rates for robbery or attacks are not higher for women.
- The second determinant of fear of street crime is the place of residence. This could however be again an **artefact** as fear of crime is typically operationalized by survey items referring to urban scenarios and the Special EUROBAROMETER uses data which carries that urban bias.
- The presence of local drugs scenes acts as a source of feelings of insecurity

The second relevant Special EUROBAROMETER is *Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* (2003),⁸ the following results of which are relevant to report here:

- Feelings of insecurity are more common among the over-55 age-group and least common among the younger parts of the population. This **corresponds** to Special EUROBAROMETER 100 findings cited above.
- Women express feelings of insecurity to a far greater degree than men. This **corresponds** to Special EUROBAROMETER 100 findings cited above.
- Respondents in the managerial category, expressed the lowest feelings of insecurity as for street crime (“feeling unsafe when dark”) and house persons the highest; persons with a managerial occupation least believed that more policing can reduce crime, whereas house persons most believed so. This **corresponds** to Special EUROBAROMETER 100 findings cited above.

7 See annex 2: “Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security”, correlation matrix (d) and hypothesis 11.

8 *Special EUROBAROMETER: Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* (2003) <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_181_en.pdf>.

Standard EUROBAROMETER Secondary Analysis

General explanation

green = country value is below EU average

red = country value is above EU average

Table 1

“Crime” as a concern of citizens on the national level – among the two most important issues according to EUROBAROMETER (EB), over time (fall editions) [%]

	Change 2003/ 2007 (in %)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
EB no.		60	62	64	66	68
Q no.		2.1	33	30	23	6a
AT	-46	28	24	14	12	15
BG	-8	-	25	24	25	23
FR	-43	30	27	26	29	17
DE	-17	18	18	11	13	15
IT	18	28	23	25	25	33
NL	-36	52	30	32	24	33
SE	-9	32	35	31	23	29
UK	-8	48	27	41	34	44
EU	-14	28*	24**	24**	23**	24***

*) EU-15

**) EU-25

***) EU-27

Table 2

Locus of decision-making and action in crime fighting (national/EU [%]) according to EUROBAROMETER (EB), over time (fall editions)

	Majority for/ against EU Ø(2005- 2007)	2003 ° EU-15	2004° EU-25	2005	2006	2007
EB no.		60	62	64	66	68
Q no.		8.5	35	31	24	20a

AT	EU+	47/49	46/48	35/61	41/55	36/62
BG	EU+	-	-	39/55	43/52	28/64
FR	EU	67/30	70/26	45/52	50/48	46/53
DE	EU+	63/33	77/20	29/69	26/73	20/79
IT	EU	57/37	58/36	33/63	32/64	26/66
NL	EU	78/21	84/15	31/68	36/64	33/66
SE	NAT-	76/21	81/17	54/44	62/36	44/55
UK	NAT-	75/21	74/21	65/33	69/28	62/34
EU	EU	63/33*	64/32**	38/59**	38/59**	36/61***

o) Item is specific and refers to urban crime prevention; this item has been dismissed from 2005 on in favour of a general “fight against crime” item.

*) EU-15

**) EU-25

***) EU-27

Table 3

r (2005-2007) Crime as a concern of citizens on the national level and in favour of national decision-making (HYP[otesis]: National locus of successful intervention)

positive r: More concern of citizens about crime on the national level is associated with more favour for national (as opposed to European) decision-making and activity in crime fighting and/or vice versa.

negative r: More concern of citizens about crime on the national level is associated with less favour for national (as opposed to European) decision-making and activity in crime fighting and/or vice versa.

AT	0.84	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
BG	0.97	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
FR	0.52	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
DE	0.81	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
IT	-0.46	Citizens desire European solutions for national security problems
NL	0.51	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
SE	0.49	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
UK	-0.26	r too low to interpret
EU	0.63	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems

→ Citizens perceive national interventions to be most suitable to enhance their security against crime

Table 4**r (2005-2007) Crime as a concern of citizens on the national level and in favour of EU decision-making (HYP: European locus of successful intervention)**

positive r: More concern of citizens about crime on the national level is associated with more favour for European (as opposed to national) decision-making and activity in crime fighting and/or vice versa.

negative r: More concern of citizens about crime on the national level is associated with less favour for European (as opposed to national) decision-making and activity in crime fighting and/or vice versa.

AT	-0.81	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
BG	-0.96	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
FR	-0.55	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
DE	-0.81	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
IT	0.37	Citizens desire European solutions for national security problems
NL	-0.51	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
SE	-0.48	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems
UK	0.29	r rather low to interpret
EU	-0.63	Citizens desire national solutions for national security problems

→ The EU is generally not perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime

Table 5**European Union means more crime according to EUROBAROMETER (EB), over time (fall editions) [%] (“What does the European Union mean to you personally?”)**

	2003 EU-15	2004	2005	2006	2007
EB no.	60	62	64	-	-
Q no.	6.2	16	13	-	-
AT	34	46	44	Item not contained	Item not contained
BG	-	6	6		
FR	12	11	12		
DE	33	40	36		
IT	8	12	13		
NL	22	22	25		
SE	35	33	35		
UK	10	8	12		
EU	16*	18**	18**		

*) EU-15

**) EU-25

***) EU-27

Table 6**r (2003-2005) Does perception of crime as a problem on the national level correlate with the perception that the European Union means more crime? (HYP: EU is locus of fear of crime in the own country)**

positive r: Stronger perception of crime as a national (as opposed to European) problem is associated with stronger perception of the European Union as a source of crime and/or vice versa.

negative r: Stronger perception of crime as a national (as opposed to European) problem is associated with fainter perception of the European Union as a source of crime and/or vice versa.

AT	-0.61	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of crime is externalized (high perception of crime as product of the EU is associated with low perception of crime as a national problem) → does not support HYP
BG	--	Insufficient survey data
FR	0.28	Citizens tend to perceive national crime and EU crime as the same; fear of crime is Europeanizing → supports HYP
DE	0.08	r value does not support interpretation
IT	-0.83	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of crime is internalized/nationalized (low perception of crime as product of the EU is associated with high perception of crime as a national problem) → does not support HYP
NL	-0.43	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of EU-inferred and national crime seems to be mutually reinforcing (both perception of crime as a product of the EU and perception of crime as a national problem are over-average) → does not support HYP
SE	-0.97	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as distinct; fear of crime seems to be mutually reinforcing (both perception of crime as a product of the EU and perception of crime as a national problem are over-average) → does not support HYP
UK	0.65	Citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as the same while making under-average EU-blaming (see table 5); fear of crime is Europeanized → supports HYP
EU	-1.00	EU citizens perceive national crime and EU crime as totally distinct and on average perceive crime either as a national or as a European problem → does not support HYP

→ The EU is generally not a source of citizen fear of crime

Table 7**r (2003-2005) EU means more crime and in favour of national decision-making
(Reinforcement of EU locus of fear of crime HYP)**

positive r: Stronger perception of the European Union as a source of crime is associated with more favour for national decision-making and/or vice versa.

negative r: Stronger perception of the European Union as a source of crime is associated with less favour for national decision-making and/or vice versa.

AT	-0.43	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
BG	--	insufficient survey data
FR	-0.59	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
DE	0.36	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with more favour of national decision-making → citizens perceive a certain amount of crime to be caused by the EU, so the EU is a cause of fear of crime
IT	-0.63	Perception of crime as EU-based is strongly associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
NL	-0.99	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
SE	-0.64	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP
UK	-0.82	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → adaptation of HYP in the light of table 6 UK figure: EU is perceived as cause of crime, but EU-caused crime is supposed to be solved at EU level
EU	-0.47	Perception of crime as EU-based is associated with less favour of national decision-making → does not enforce EU locus of fear of crime HYP

→ The EU is generally not a source of citizen fear of crime

General findings from correlation analysis to be considered and tested in further CPSI research

- The EU generally does not seem to be a source of citizen fear of crime in their own country; France, Germany and the UK appear to be exceptions.
- Citizens perceive national interventions to be most suitable to enhance their security against crime; the exception is Italy, where citizens appear to prefer EU solutions also to national security problems. UK r values, while supporting no strong interpretation, point to a possible interpretation in a similar direction.
- Despite public support for EU decision-making and action against crime, the EU itself is generally not perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime; the exception is Italy. UK r values, while supporting no strong interpretation, point to a possible interpretation in a similar direction.

ANNEX 2

Country profile empirical data sheet / perceived vs. actual security

Collection and secondary analysis of aggregated criminological data on the national level

This desk research ply presents a sum-up of empirical criminological statistical findings (based on indicators testable by means of opinion polls and interviews) associated with felt vs. factual fear of crime and factors causing fear of crime. In its last part, it derives testable hypotheses for further empirical work in the CPSI public opinion work package and for the validation study. These hypotheses cover “causes of fear of crime” (also in relation to actual security) and “social effectiveness criteria for security technologies” (with CCTV as example).

A general problem with related empirical data is scope and timeliness. The scope is typically limited in the sense that criminological data – the same is the case for public opinion/fear of crime data) are not in every country collected in a comparable fashion and often represent hot-spots (such as large urban areas). Criminological data on national levels as well as on a European/international level become available 3-4 years time-lagged.

Main sources for academic use for desk research purposes, such as the *European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice*,¹ important for indicators for actual security, is currently available with its volume 3 (1996),² covering the period 2000-2003. Only the announced volume 4, to be published in 2009, will reach up to the year 2007.

The *International Crime Victims Survey* (ICVS)³ currently covers the years up to 2004/05 (ICVS-5); it is relevant because it has data aggregated on the country level. ICVS-6 is prepared for 2009.

The *European Crime and Safety Survey* (EU ICS),⁴ a consortium sponsored by DG RTD under FP6-SSP-2002-1, produced survey data and capital, regional as well as national maps based on field work in 2005. It covers a range of issues associated with citizens’ perceptions of security, including classical items such as “feeling (un)safe when walking in dark”. EU ICS data are included in this paper. The Full Report is available online.⁵

The reporting on criminal justice statistics in this paper includes other trusted sources in order to allow comparisons of aggregated national data and set a baseline for factual and for perceived security data for further analysis.

The *European Forum for Urban Safety*⁶ was chosen as the basic source for the empirical country profiling presented in this paper. It collects both qualitative and quantitative national-level data on factual and felt security in European countries. All statistical values in the subsequent matrix are from *European Forum of Urban Safety* country profiles⁷ if not otherwise stated. Country profiles missing on the European Forum for Urban Safety were substituted by data from *NationMaster*.⁸ NationMaster is massive central data source to compare nations, based on a vast compilation of data from such sources as the CIA World Factbook, UN, and OECD.

Other sources include the *Standard EUROBAROMETER*,⁹ secondary analysis of which is on a larger scale reported in an own informal deliverable produced by the WWEDU Center for European Security Studies. The EUROBAROMETER is especially useful for tracing changes in citizens' perceived security over time. There have been two relevant *Special EUROBAROMETER*: The first is *Europeans and Public Security* (1996)¹⁰ (based on a selection of items from the *International Crime Victims Survey – ICVS – 1996*), on the eve of the establishment of the Area of Justice, Liberty and Security in the EU Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which is too long a time distance to be included in the present secondary analysis. However, this Special EUROBAROMETER contains relevant hypothetical conclusions about sources citizens' fear of crime, focused on street crime,¹¹ which can be the basis of further CPSI work and are reported in annex 1. The second is *Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* (2003)¹² with original opinion survey data from 2002. Criminological sources as described here offer more timely data so that this Special EUROBAROMETER will also be considered on a subsidiary basis.

On a case-by case basis, evidence from the *URBANEYE*¹³ project on public CCTV acceptance and research on cultural factors of national security perceptions conducted within Working Group 10 (Governance and Coordination) of the *European Security Research and Innovation Forum* (ESRIF) is taken into account.¹⁴

Empirical country profile matrix

based on latest available information (2003-2008) on

European Forum for Urban Safety, <http://www.urbansecurity.org>

NationMaster, <http://www.nationmaster.com>

European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS), <http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu>

Standard EUROBAROMETER and relevant *Special EUROBAROMETERS*, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion

International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), <http://www.rechten.ut.nl/icvc>

European Sourcebook of Criminal Justice (ESB), <http://www.europeansourcebook.org>

URBANEYE, <http://www.urbaneye.net>

European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), Working Group 10 (Governance and Coordination), <http://www.esrif.eu>

		AT	BG ¹⁵	DE	FR ¹⁶	IT ¹⁷	NL ¹⁸	SE	GB (Engl.+Wales)	<i>Arithmetic mean</i>
0	Citizens' general feeling of safety ¹⁹	79%	n/a	65%	66%	56%	78%	79%	57% (all UK)	64%
1	ICVS victimization level ²⁰	low	n/a	average	low	average	high	average	high	n/a
2	Offences (reported to police) per 100.000 population and % change 2000-2003 ²¹	7.881 +14% average	1.729 -2% below average	7.976 +5% average	6.605 +4% below average	4.236 +11% below average	8.530 +4% above average	13.995 +3% above average	11.241 n/a above average	7.774 (8 country average)
3	ICVS personal fear of crime level ²²	low (20%)	high (57.5%)	low (26.5%)	average (29.5%)	high (39%)	low (18%)	low (18%)	average (33.5%)	8 countries (32.5%)
4	Relation between felt (line 3) and actual (line 1) personal security indicator	realistic perception of security/realistic perception of crime risk	n/a	overperception of security/ underperception of crime risk	underperception of security/ overperception of crime risk	underperception of security/ overperception of crime risk	overperception of security/ underperception of crime risk	overperception of security/ underperception of crime risk	overperception of security/ underperception of crime risk	

5	National social fear of crime level ²³	average (24%)	average (25%)	low (18%)	average (27%)	low (23%)	high (30%)	high (35%)	average (27%)	8 countries (26.1%)
6	Relationship between felt societal security (line 5) and actual security (line 1)	social overfear	n/a	social underfear	social overfear	social underfear	realistic social fear	social overfear	social underfear	
7	Relationship between felt societal security (line 5) and felt personal security (line 2) level	social > personal fear level social fear culture	n/a	social = personal fear level balanced fear culture	social = personal fear level balanced fear culture	social < personal fear level personal fear culture	social > personal fear level	social > personal fear level social fear culture	social = personal fear level balanced fear culture	
9	CCTV acceptance (public support in capital city) ²⁴	45,5%		56%					94,40%	
10	Technology as threat/source of insecurity or as a solution ²⁵	Threat		Solution	Threat	Solution	Threat	Solution	Solution	
11	Police penetration per 100.000	323	310	303 ²⁶	408	556	192	185	205	310
12	Main offences ranked (based on reporting to police)	Theft Vehicle theft Assault Sexual violence Homicide	Theft/Robbery Transport and communication crimes Crimes against governance (esp. illegal crossing of boundary) Drug-related crimes	Theft Fraud Damage to Property Assault / Bodily injury Drug related crime	Theft People offences Economic offences Drug-related infractions		Bicycle theft Vandalism of cars	Violent crime Theft of a motor vehicle Domestic Burglary Robbery Drug trafficking	Theft Criminal damage (vandalism) Violence against persons Burglary Fraud	

13	Trust in police ²⁷	81% (54%, 1996)	53% (n/a)	74% (n/a)	60% (65%)	65% ²⁸ (50%, 1992)	70% ²⁹ (52%)	65% ³⁰ (61%)	75% ³¹ (72%)	ICVS/EU ICS 70% (65%)
14	Perception of home security indicator (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) ³²	21% (13%, 1996)	31% (n/a)	23% (n/a)	38% (44%)	43% (38%, 1992)	18% (19%)	17% (16%)	35% (33%)	ICVS/EU ICS 29% (31%)
15	Perception of street security indicator (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) ³³	19% (20%, 1996)	53% (n/a)	30% (n/a)	21% (22%)	35% (35%, 1992)	18% (18%)	19% (15%)	32% (26%)	ICVS/EU ICS 27% (22%)
16	Minors percentage (under 18)	10.2%	10.3%	12.2%	19.9%	n/a	n/a	25%	27%	
17	Foreigners percentage	30.0%	1.4% (2004)	22.0%	19.5%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
18	Main debates	Domestic violence Trafficking and illegal immigration Prevention of drug addiction and drug related crime Violence in the media Violence in schools EU enlargement and Schengen	Political crime and corruption Organized crime/violence Weaknesses of the judiciary Violence during sport events (hooliganism, police action) Domestic and sexual violence towards women Rights of victims of violence	Child Abuse and Domestic violence Violence against foreigners /migrants motivated by racism, right-wing, xenophobia and/or anti-Semitism Violence in schools Trafficking in human beings	Youth delinquency Role of city majors in policing/ criminal justice Road safety Specialised prevention (mediators, street educators) Sharing of information between the justice, the police				Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) Terrorism (in the light of July 2005 terrorist attacks in London) Racism and Hate Crimes (considering large increase, doubled since 2000)	

19	Political initiatives/ National action plans	Platform against Violence in the Family (1993) National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (2003) Action Plan against Child Abuse and Child Pornography on the Internet (1998) Youngrights Action Plan (2003) Crime Victims Assistance Act (1972) Protection against Domestic Violence Act (1997)	National Strategy for Counteracting Crime (2002 - 2005) National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2001-2004) Countering Trafficking in Human Beings (2003) Domestic violence (2003) Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (2003) Combating Sport and Football Hooliganism (2003) National strategy on prevention and counteracting the antisocial behaviour and the offences of minors and juveniles (2003)	National action plan: The Standing Conference of Ministers of the Interior approved a joint programme on internal security in 1974, which has been continued in 1998 Partnership structures at the regional level: In 2002 the <i>Länder</i> governments set up a Working Group on the Prevention of Violence	Crime prevention organized on the local level National action plan: co-operation between several secretaries: Home affairs, defence, justice, education, labour, urban policy	Provisions for the coordination of public security and local police forces, and for integrated security polices			Domestic Violence: Crime and Victims Bill (April 2005) Sexual offences Act (2003) A new deal for victims and witnesses strategy (July 2003) Crime and Disorder Act (1999) Football Disorder Act (2000) The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act established partnerships between the police, local authorities, probation service, health authorities, the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses.	
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Statistical analysis, interpretation and development of testable hypotheses

Correlations of values in the Empirical country profile matrix (line no. given in brackets)

(a) Actual insecurity (by amount of crime reported to police) (5)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Perceived societal insecurity (crime as a problem “out there”) (2)	.57	More crime is associated with higher perceived societal insecurity Hypothesis: Actual insecurity increases societal fear of crime.
Perceived personal insecurity (crime as an individual concern) (= ICVS National personal fear of crime level) (3)	-.77	More crime is associated with lower perceived personal security Hypothesis: Actual insecurity decreases personal fear of crime.
(b) Trust in police (13)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of street crime (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) (15)	-.54	Feeling unsafe when walking in dark is associated with lower trust in police; trust in police lowers perception of insecurity. Hypothesis: Trust-building interventions (such as community policing) reduce citizens’ fear of crime.
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of home-related crime (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	-.37	Perceived likeliness of burglary is associated with lower trust in police; trust in police lowers perception of insecurity. Hypothesis: Trust-building interventions (such as community policing) reduce citizens’ fear of crime.
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	.40	Victimization (by means of reported offences) is positively associated with trust in police. Hypothesis: More trust in police leads to more reporting of offences, thus increasing reported crime rates without a necessary increase in victimization levels. However, more victimization (reported offences) could bring more trust in police (which in the light of offence reporting may be perceived as a problem-solver).




Police penetration (11)	-0.25	Higher police penetration is lightly associated with lower trust in police; higher trust in police is associated with lower penetration. Hypothesis: Police can use penetration as a response to lack of public trust.
(c) Police penetration (11)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	-0.61	Higher police penetration is associated with less reported offences; more offences are associated with less police penetration. Hypothesis: Police-penetration enhancing interventions such as community policing reduce crime rates, thus increasing factual security. Less policing causes more crime.
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of street crime (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) (15)	.26	Higher police penetration is lightly associated with higher perception of insecurity/fear for street crime. Hypothesis: Police penetration (visibility of police) is a moderate cause of citizen’s fear of street crime.
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of home-related crime (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	.74	Higher police penetration is heavily associated with higher perception of insecurity/fear for burglary. Hypothesis: Police penetration (visibility of police) is a cause of citizen fear of home-related crime. Citizens perceive intervention strategies (such as community policing) that include making police visible and touchable as response to, as opposed to prevention of, home-related crime, thus increasing fear perception in this sector.
		Hypothesis: Increased police penetration reduces (reported) crime but increases citizens perception of insecurity. This effect is stronger for home-related crime than for street crime.

(d) Perception of insecurity indicator – street crime (feeling unsafe when walking in dark) (15)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Perception of insecurity indicator – fear of home-related crime (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	.47	Fear of street crime and fear of home crime are positively associated with one another. Hypothesis: [Direction of influence determined by path analysis]
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	-.68	More reported offences are associated with lower perception of insecurity indicator; result is counterintuitive. Association is higher than in the case of home-related crime. Hypothesis: Reported offences increase citizens’ perceptions of street security; as increase in reported offences is also associated with increase of trust in police, belief in effective state authorities’ intervention reduces fear of crime. Low rate of reported offences increases fear of crime and reduces trust in police – probably because it lowers citizens’ belief in effective state authorities’ intervention. However, results could also be due to the effect of “if the others get the crime, we won’t get it” reported in literature for “distant” crime. ³⁴

(e) Perception of insecurity indicator – home (burglary in the house very likely in the coming year) (14)	r	Explanation and interpretation
Actual insecurity (offences reported to police) (2)	-.52	<p>More reported offences are associated with lower perception of insecurity indicator; result is counterintuitive. Association is lower than in the case of home-related crime.</p> <p>Hypothesis: Reported offences increase citizens’ perceptions of security; as increase in reported offences is also associated with increase of trust in police, belief in effective state authorities’ intervention can be expected to reduce fear of crime. Low rate of reported offences increases fear of crime and reduces trust in police – probably because it lowers citizens’ belief in effective state authorities’ intervention. However, results could also be due to the effect of “if the others get crime, we don’t get it” reported in literature.³⁵ Lower r value than in case of street crime can be interpreted as evidence for the public authority efficiency hypothesis, because according to it, public space-related crime has stronger impact on trust in interventions than home-related crime.</p>

Path models

The following draft causal models were developed for further research to consistently integrate the maximum of the hypothesis as derived from the correlations. A first-draft statistical path model conception was then undertaken, yielding the following path coefficients:



According to the results of this tentative path analysis, the hypotheses can be assessed as follows:

	Hypothesis	Result of path analysis	Contradicts/needs to be checked against hypothesis no.
1	Trust-building interventions such as community policing reduce citizens' fear of crime	Hypothesis needs to be differentiated : Trust-building interventions such as community policing reduce citizens' fear of street crime but have no significant effect on fear of home-related crime	2, 10
2	More trust in police leads to more reporting of offences, thus increasing reported crime rates without a necessary increase in victimization levels	Hypothesis needs to be amended : The bigger the trust in police, the more offences are reported, and this increases fear of crime Interpretation and follow-up hypothesis : Through this causal path, interventions (such as community policing) that increase trust in police may indirectly increase fear of crime	1, 4, 5, 6
3	More reported offences increase trust in police (which in the light of offence reporting may be perceived as a problem-solver)	Not tested in the models, but affirmative evidence (see hypothesis 10)	
4	Belief in effective state authorities' intervention reduces fear of crime	Reinforced	2
5	Lower rate of reported offences (a) increases fear of crime and (b) reduces trust in police (probably because it lowers citizens' belief in effective state authorities' intervention)	(a) Reinforced (b) Not tested in the path models, but affirmative evidence (see hypotheses 3 and 19)	11, 13

6	Police-penetration enhancing interventions such as community policing reduce crime rates (reported offences), thus increasing factual security	Reinforced	2
7	Less policing causes more crime	Not tested in the path models	9
8	Police penetration (visibility of police) is a moderate cause of citizens' general fear of street crime	Rejected: Police penetration reduces fear of street crime	
9	Police penetration (visibility of police) is a cause of citizens' fear of home-related crime	Strongly reinforced	7
10	Increased police penetration reduces (reported) crime but increases citizens' perception of insecurity (fear of crime)	Reinforced for fear of crime in general (see also hypothesis 5); Rejected for fear of home-related crime: no causal effect Rejected for fear of street crime: Police penetration increases number of reported offences, and this increased number reduces fear of street crime. Provides affirmative evidence for hypothesis 3	1
11	Actual insecurity (reported offences) increases citizens' perceptions of insecurity (fear of crime)	Hypothesis needs to be differentiated: Decrease in actual security (more offences) increases general fear of crime Decrease in actual security (more offences) strongly reduces citizens' fear of street crime . This contradicts earlier survey research ³⁶ Decrease in actual security (more offences) increases or leaves unchanged citizens' fear of home-related crime	5
12	Fear of street crime causes fear of home crime	Hypothesis developed through path analysis	16

Qualitative findings

The following table shows qualitative configurations of similarities/differences between the countries of the matrix above, reflecting relevant of its figures. “1” means over-average, “0” average and “-” under-average. Colours mark similar values/configurations.

	AT	BG	DE	FR	IT ³⁷	NL	SE	UK ³⁸ (data for England and Wales)
Tentative typology of citizen security culture Personal fear : victimization and social fear : victimization and crime rate : perception of crime as a prior problem according to EURO-BAROMETER ³⁹ over time	Realistic fear of crime Social fear culture	Overfear Personal fear culture	Underfear Balanced personal/social fear culture	Overfear Balanced personal/social fear culture	(scattered; in sum close to realistic fear of crime) Personal fear culture	Between underfear and realistic fear of crime Social fear culture	Unbalanced Social fear culture	Underfear Balanced personal/social fear culture
Victimization (line 1 in the table above)	-	0	0	-	0	+	0	+
Over/under-average offences per 100.000 population (line 2)	0	-	0	-	-	+	+	+
Personal fear of crime level (line 3)	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	0
Personal fear : victimization (line 4)	0	n/a	-	+	+	-	-	-
Social fear of crime level (line 5)	0	0	-	0	-	+	+	0
Social fear : victimization (line 6)	+	n/a	-	+	-	0	+	-
Relationship between felt societal security and felt personal security level (line 7)	social > personal	n/a	social = personal	social = personal	social < personal	social > personal	social > personal	social = personal

Public debates centred on ... security (line 18 compared to line 12)	perceived	actual	perceived	actual	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
Policy interventions based on ... security (line 19 compared to line 12)	actual	perceived	perceived	perceived	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
CCTV acceptance (public support in capital); missing ratings substituted by quantitative evidence from CPSI cause country studies (line 9)	-	n/a	0	-	+	n/a	n/a	+
Technology as threat/ source of insecurity or as a solution (line 10)	Threat		Solution	Threat	Solution	Threat	Solution	Solution

This qualitative matrix allows for following tentative conclusions as hypotheses for further research:

Causes of fear of crime

Which factors are present in high-fear of crime countries that are not present in other countries?

High social fear of crime countries (crime perceived as a problem “out there”) have under-average personal fear of crime, but an over-average number offences reported to police (low actual security). Personal fear of crime is also lower than the victimization level would suggest.

High personal fear of crime countries (crime perceived as an individual/-ized problem) can have average victimization levels. They have an under-average number of offences reported to police (high actual security) and average or under-average social fear of crime. Personal fear of crime is thus

more detached from actual security than social fear of crime. More social fear of crime is associated with less personal fear of crime. This leads to the hypothesis that social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime.

	Hypothesis		Contradicts/needs to be checked against hypothesis no.
13	Actual insecurity increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem “out there”)	Reinforced by quantitative analysis of extreme groups	5
14	Actual insecurity decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern)	Reinforced by quantitative analysis of extreme groups	
15	Actual insecurity causes social fear of crime and at the same time reduces personal fear of crime		
16	Social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime		12

Realistic vs. constructed fear of crime

A good matching between crime rate/main offences (line 12 in the matrix) and public debates (line 18) can either be evidence of a reflective/responsive public debate and realistic fear of crime or of poor preventive effect of risk communication. A good matching exists in France. Sufficient matching exists in Bulgaria and the UK.

A poor matching between crime rate/main offences and public debates can either be evidence of a non-responsive public debate and unrealistic or (e.g. media-)constructed fear of crime or of good preventive effect of risk communication. A poor matching exists in Austria and Germany.

Matching of political initiatives (line 19) with crime rate/main offences (line 12) or public debates (line 18) can give a hint, to be followed by further analysis, if public interventions are more directed at actual or perceived security issues:

In Austria and the UK, interventions are more directed at actual security issues.

In Bulgaria, France and Germany, interventions are more directed at perceived security issues.

Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden could not be classified due to lack of relevant information in the table.

Summary of evidenced causes of/predictors for fear of crime

(includes results from annex 1: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”)

- Victimization: Actual (in-)security by rate of reported offences (lower rate **increases** fear of crime; does not apply to street crime)
- Differentiation by type of fear: Actual insecurity causes social fear of crime and at the same time reduces personal fear of crime
- Gender: Women express feelings of insecurity to a far greater degree than men
- Age: Feelings of insecurity are more common among the over-55 age-group and least common among the younger parts of the population
- Trust in police (reduces fear of crime)
- Police penetration (increases fear of home-related crime, but reduces fear of street crime)
- Fear of street crime (causes fear of home crime)

The EU is generally not a source of citizen fear of crime; exceptions are France, Germany and the UK

Specific causes/predictors for fear of street crime:

- Political/societal transition
- Social vulnerability (exposure to actual violence in combination with limited resources to deal with the economic consequences of victimization)
- Income: Lower income is associated with more street crime (reinforces the social vulnerability hypothesis)
- Occupation: Respondents in the managerial category, expressed the lowest feelings of insecurity as for street crime and house persons the highest; persons with a managerial occupation least believed that more policing can reduce crime, whereas house persons most believed so.
- Actual security by rate of reported offences (higher rate **reduces** fear of street crime)
- Gender (female)
- Urbanization/Place of residence. This could be an artefact as fear of crime is typically operationalized by survey items referring to urban scenarios (“feeling fear when walking in dark” and others)
- Trust in local authorities (reduces fear of street crime)
- Age (older citizens more often feel unsafe in their own area)
- Presence of local drugs scenes
- Trust-building interventions such as community policing (reduce fear of street crime)

Acceptance of technological solutions for security problems (example: CCTV acceptance)

CPSI case countries in sum show *no* consistent association between acceptance of CCTV and relationship between level of societal and of personal fear of crime, level of victimization, relationship between felt and actual personal/social security and victimization.

They however show consistent association between acceptance of CCTV and cultural attitudes towards technology: Countries in which technology is interpreted as part of the security problem (e.g. critical infrastructure protection, information technology as object of offence and source of

insecurity), public CCTV acceptance is lower than in countries where technology is interpreted as part of the solution (e.g. information technology as a foundation for coordinated, efficient prevention and response).

	Hypothesis	
17	(Citizen security culture) Acceptance of technological solutions for security problems does not depend on the country's citizen security perception tendency (social under-/overfear as compared to crime rate, personal fear of crime and social fear of crime)	To be tested by further research
18	(Technology culture) Acceptance of technological solutions for security problems is less influenced by the security problem than by general attitudes towards technology	To be tested by further research

Endnotes

- 1 <http://www.europeansourcebook.org>.
- 2 http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3_Full.pdf.
- 3 <http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs>; Result report: J.J.M. Van Dijk/J.N. van Kesteren/P. Smit: *Criminal Victimization in International Perspective: Key Findings from the 2004-2005 ICVS and EU ICS*. The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers, 2008 <http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs/pdffiles/ICVS2004_05.pdf>.
- 4 <http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu>.
- 5 http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/euics_rp.htm.
- 6 <http://www.urbansecurity.org>.
- 7 <http://www.urbansecurity.org/index.php?id=88>.
- 8 <http://www.nationamster.com>.
- 9 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm.

- 10 J.J.M. van Dijk/L.G. Toornvliet: *Towards a Eurobarometer of Public Safety. Key Findings of the First Survey on Public Safety among the Residents of the European Union. Report presented at the Seminar on the Prevention of Urban Delinquency linked to Drugs Dependence*. Brussels: European Commission, 21-22 November 1996. [Registered as Special EUROBAROMETER 100] <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_100_en.pdf>.
- 11 Ibid., p. 9-10.
- 12 *Special EUROBAROMETER 181: Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime* <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_181_en.pdf>.
- 13 <http://www.urbaneye.net>. The final report is: Leon Hempel/Eric Töpfer: *CCTV in Europe. Final Report*. Berlin: Centre for Technology and Society, Technical University Berlin, 2004 <http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf>.
- 14 As reported in: Alexander Siedschlag: *European Countries National Security Research Policy Compared in the Light of FP 7*. WWEDU World Wide Education (Wels/Austria) – Center for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, No 10 (July 2008) <<http://www.european-security.info/asp10.pdf>>.
- 15 European Forum for Urban Safety data amended by National Statistical Institute (Bulgaria): “Crimes with Penalty Inflicted and Persons Convicted by 2007” (basic data), http://www.nsi.bg/SocialActivities_e/Crime_e.htm.
- 16 Latest available data are from 2004.
- 17 No country profile available on EFUS, data substituted by <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/it-italy/crime> drawing from UNICRI (2001-2003).
- 18 No country profile available on EFUS, data substituted by <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/nl-netherlands/crime> drawing from UNICRI (2001-2003).
- 19 *Special EUROBAROMETER 181: Public Safety, Exposure to Drug-related Problems and Crime*, op. cit. (fn 12), pp. 14-15, sum of feeling “very safe” and feeling “fairly safe”.
- 20 One-year victimization rate (2004) from EU ICS as an indicator for actual security according to Jan van Dijk/Robert Manchin/John van Kesteren/Gergely Hideg: *The Burden of Crime in the EU: A Comparative Analysis of the European Survey of Crime and Safety*. Brussels: Gallup Europe, 2007 <<http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/intervict/burdenofcrimefinal.pdf>>, p. 19.
- 21 Latest available figures (2003), http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3_Full.pdf, p. 37.
- 22 Countries ranked above, on or below average according to arithmetic mean of the two perception of safety indicator values in lines 12 and 13 (in brackets) in relation to arithmetic mean of the sum of all eight country values. Data from ICVS 2004-2005, as reported in Van Dijk/van Kesteren/Smit, op. cit. (fn 3).
- 23 “Crime” among the two most important issues on the national level, from *Standard EUROBAROMETER 62* (Autumn 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm, Question 33 (in brackets) in relation to arithmetic mean of the sum of all eight country values. Data are of limited value because national social fear of crime values are fluctuating, including changes in the scope of more than 10 percent points in three years. This can be followed in annex 1: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”. However, for purposes of comparison with the actual and personal fear of crime indicators, which are only available for up to 2004, reference is made here to *EUROBAROMETER 2004* results.
- 24 Hempel/Töpfer, op. cit. (fn 12), p. 44.
- 25 Alexander Siedschlag, op. cit. (fn 13).
- 26 Only Bundesländer police force counted, as relevant for urban crime (federal police not counted).
- 27 ICVS 2004-2005 and 2005 EU ICS (as compared to 2000), Van Dijk/van Kesteren/Smit, op. cit. (fn 3), p. 143.

- 28 Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- 29 Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- 30 Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- 31 Figures for trust in police do not reproduce Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003) finding about under-average belief in police effectiveness in crime fighting.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
- 33 Ibid., p. 132.
- 34 See Valerie J. Callanan: *Feeding the Fear of Crime: Crime-related Media and Support for Three Strikes*. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2005, p. 81.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 See annex 1: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”, p. 3.
- 37 *Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003)* finding that Italy is a high-fear country could only be reproduced for personal fear of crime.
- 38 *Special EUROBAROMETER 181 (2003)* finding that the UK is a high-fear country could not be reproduced.
- 39 See annex 1: “Crime as a national vs. European concern of citizens and perceived efficiency of national vs. EU interventions – A EUROBAROMETER secondary analysis”.