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Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies

Austria – Bulgaria – France – Germany – Italy – Netherlands – Sweden – United Kingdom

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Introduction

This document presents a summary of the country case studies conducted in the course of the CPSI research project (www.cpsi-fp7.eu), covering the countries represented in the CPSI end-user advisory group: Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This summary is mainly based on analyses and data from the CPSI Deliverable 4.4: *Report on Cultural Issues – Changing Perceptions of Security Requires European Cultural Sensitivity* but also introduces additional information in order to place the country cases into a broader context, including findings from other CPSI work, such as public opinion (Work Package 2.3). The purpose is to link results from the security culture analysis by the CEUSS | Center for European Security Studies within the CPSI project with the overarching research questions of that project as a whole: Public perception of the issue of security and related attitudes towards security-enhancing interventions, mainly as associated with technology, such as video surveillance.

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How does culture guide security and threat perceptions of citizens? In particular, how does culture mediate between citizens' factual and perceived security? How does a country's public culture inform policies of security-enhancing interventions and shape citizens' responses? The country case studies address these questions on the national level, thus complementing the parts of the CPSI project identifying general rules that guide the experience of security in subjective terms.

This is important to do because the absence of national crime surveys throughout the EU forecloses a one-stop comparative approach to the way fear of crime effects different member states' publics. In order to benefit a cross-country comparative perspective, each of the country cases is presented following the same structure of leading questions, centred on the sphere of crime following the CPSI project's empirical focus:

– What is a short descriptor of the respective nations' collective security culture in the context of the characteristics of the political system?
– What is the public – if relevant as opposed to the political – understanding of "security" as an acquired value, in particular as a normative cultural value?
– How do security concerns impact political cultures: What are the citizens' expectations from the state as a security provider? Is there a demand by the general public for more information on and more involvement in security interventions?
– Is there a general public awareness of security technologies, support for their development and how do the above-mentioned characteristics influence the public's acceptance of security-enhancing interventions and technologies?
– Which social effectiveness criteria for security technologies can we derive from this?

The CPSI country case studies are based on the following data: Secondary analysis of EUROBAROMETER surveys, country information provided on official government websites, national security strategies, and country risk analyses form non-governmental and business organizations.[2]

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2   This data is described and discussed in detail in deliverable D4.4 and has in part been published as CPSI intermediate result, see Alexander Siedschlag: European Countries National Security Research Policy Compared in the Light of FP 7," CEUSS | Center for European Security Studies – Analytical Standpoint, no. 10 (July 2008), http://www.european-security.info/asp10.pdf; Alexander Siedschlag & Andrea Jerković: "First Results #1: Primary interpretation of survey findings to identify national citizen security cultures," CEUSS | Center for European Security Studies – Analytical Standpoint, no. 12 (November 2008), http://www.european-security.info/asp12.pdf.

In the culture analysis contributing to this country report, we distinguish between personal fear of crime and social fear of crime as factors related to the association, or dissociation, between factual and felt security as well as short descriptors of citizen security culture.[3] Personal fear of crime refers to the perception of crime as an individual or an individualized problem. Social fear of crime refers to the perception of crime as a collective problem "out there" in the society, irrespective of personal impact. On both levels, fear of crime may be realistic fear, underfear or overfear, depending on the relation between fear of crime and actual victimization rate (such as based on crime statistics).

There are important variations between social fear of crime and personal fear of crime. These variations are testimony to the constant interplay of cultural narratives of insecurity with personal fears in the constitution of public opinion and institutionalization of security cultures. Understanding the relationship between individual and wider social/cultural insecurities poses a principle challenge for future research and underlines the importance of developing a robust analysis of security cultures on the level of EU member states. In this context, it is important to briefly consider relevant conceptual bases.

Culture as an analytical concept refers to people's assumptions about the world, it provides the background for (re)cognition, also defining when a society will accept a problem (such as a security threat) to be solved.[4] Culture can be seen as the sum of cognitive forms by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meaning to facts as well as save and reproduce knowledge and their interpretation of the world.[5] In addition, culture reduces complexity not only in perception but also in decision-making, constraining the factual choice of options to behave based on norms and values guiding citizens' assessments and expectations.[6]

An illustrating example is the "cultural theory of risk" advanced by Douglas and Wuthnow.[7] This theory assumes that different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews: conceptions of risk,

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3   The typology of citizen security culture applied here was developed within CPSI and is based on three indicators: (1) Personal fear in relation to actual victimization level, (2) social fear in relation to actual victimization level and (3) perception of crime as a prior problem in relation to actual crime rate. Personal fear, social fear, victimization, crime rate and perception of crime as a prior problem are measured in figures from relevant survey data as documented in Alexander Siedschlag & Andrea Jerković: "First Results #1: Primary interpretation of survey findings to identify national citizen security cultures" (footnote 1).

4   Alfred Schütz: Gesammelte Aufsätze, vol. 3: Studien zur phänomenologischen Philosophie. Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1972, pp. 156-7.

5   Clifford Geertz: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

6   Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1963.

7   See especially Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky: Risk and Culture. Berkeley, CA et al.: University of California Press, 1982.

security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are selected as important because this reinforces established interpretations and relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community.

However, the majority of contemporary accounts have removed the citizen from the centre of the concept of culture, replacing it with a focus on elites. Citizens are only prominently involved in current concepts of European Security Culture when it comes to information security, which requires a certain user culture, as analysed by OECD.[8] Newer contributions terming themselves "security culture" research have therefore attempted to get the citizens themselves back into the concept, for example analysing public discourse about European security and the EU as a comprehensive security actor.[9] Apart from that, accounts of the European Security Culture centre on the international realm with a focus on strategic threats to states (rather than citizens) and have been confined to elite studies or to the level of the European Security Strategy (ESS).[10]

In sum, the conclusion drawn by Elkins and Simeon some thirty years ago remains true, namely that further research is needed to identify the actual empirical impact of culture on different policy areas, or contexts of security.[11] European countries continue to rest on distinguished symbols of what they value and need to safeguard. They show different public and citizen security cultures, and both the political sector and the public vary across countries in their perception of the locus of responsibility for citizen security. Therefore, the case studies summed up in this paper provide country-specific assess-ments of pre-existing worldviews,

> *"European countries continue to rest on distinguished symbols of what they value and need to safeguard. They show different public and citizen security cultures, and both the political sector and the public vary across countries in their perception of the locus of responsibility for citizen security."*

styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions in the European Union and its Member States, as well as the efficiency perception of technology-based security solutions.

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8   OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: "The Promotion of a Culture of Security for Information Systems and Networks in OECD Countries," DSTI/ICCP/REG(2005)1/FINAL, 2005.

9   Monica Gariup: *European Security Culture. Language, Theory, Policy.* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009.

10 See e.g. Bastian Giegerich: *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy.* Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006; Christopher O. Meyer: *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

11 David J. Elkins & Richard E. B. Simeon: "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?," *Comparative Politics* 11:2 (1979): 127-145, 143.

Austria

Realistic fear of crime and security as a national value

In Austria, the population is about 8 million. The well-developed social market economy (the achievement of sustained economic growth), services, banking, transportation, commercial facilities, international competitiveness as well as the high standard of living are deeply interlinked with the Austrian system of government. Austria is known for its consensus-oriented policy with close cooperation between all major trade unions with industry, agriculture, and the government on a broad range of social and economic issues. This is called Austria's "social partnership".[12] This appears to be an important reason for the country's social (as opposed to personal) fear culture, together with public debates centred on perceived security, whereas policy interventions tend to be based more on actual security than on public perception patterns. Nevertheless, it is being discussed publicly to what extent all the bodies involved in the social partnership are in fact acting in the public interest without being too much influenced by external economic as well as political interests.

Due to its welfare state, Austria has a low crime rate compared to other industrialized countries.[13] Comparing perceived and actual security on the national level in greater detail, we face shortages in data. No general crime statistics are available to cover the past 5-10 years. The country's Federal Ministry of the Interior is trying to develop a thematic area of analysis in the field of citizens' security awareness and needs.

As mentioned, while Austria has low victimization and personal fear of crime levels, the social fear of crime level is relatively high compared to the actual level of victimization. For example, citizens have under-average concern about crime on a national level, along with a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. At the same time, interestingly, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU itself as meaning more crime. Reflecting this social overfear of crime, as mentioned

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12   "Economy of Austria," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Austria (5 February 2010).
13   "Austria," *Crime and Society: A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World*, http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/europe/austria.html (5 February 2010).

before, public debates tend to centre on perceived rather than actual security. In sum, Austrian citizen security culture can despite be described as marked by realistic fear of crime. This may also be due to policy interventions being typically based on actual security rather than moral panic. In fact, crime as a concern for Austrian citizens has dropped over the recent year almost three times as much as the EU average.

As far as technology-related aspects of security and threat perception are concerned, the public sees technology more as a threat (or part of the problem) than a part of the solution. The Austrians' attitude towards technology-based security-enhancing interventions can be summarized as balanced against the benefits and threats of technology and privacy. Consequently, Austrian citizens differ considerably in balancing privacy against security – depending on the different individual perceptions of risks, the individual willingness to accept them and the individual preparedness to accept restrictions in privacy and human rights in return for an increase in personal security.[14] Security technologies and interventions seem to be rather judged individually on a case-by-case basis. They are neither accepted nor rejected generally. However, there is a need of proved security gains before accepting any privacy infringements. For instance, video surveillance in public spaces is regarded as much less a privacy issue than the combination and mining of different databases.

The tradition and structure of consocialism and consensus democracy limits Austrian potential for developing a shared European understanding of security problems and agreeing on a common interpretation of related challenges and acceptable interventions. It seems that there is a less Europeanized feeling of security on the side of the citizens. This fact can be expected to limit the social acceptability of international solutions for security problems, as long as they are not specifically designed to national needs.

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14   Cf. PRISE – Privacy & Security: Security Research, Workshop Paper, 4 February 2008, http://prise.oeaw.ac.at/docs/PRISE_Workshop_Paper_Vienna_February_2008.pdf.

Bulgaria

Need for public information

Bulgaria's population is about 8 million. The Bulgarian level of crime seems to be low compared to crime rates in most industrialized countries and the following factors are responsible for the falling crime rate in Bulgaria:[15] less unemployment; aging of the population and decrease in the number of young males (15-25 year olds) due to low birth rate and emigration; emigration of many criminals to the EU after the establishment of a visa-free regime with most European countries; anti-crime efforts of the police and the judiciary. The decrease in crime rates is due to social, economic and demographic reasons as well as to the judicial and executive work.

However, the so-called years of transition to democracy were affected by new criminal threats and risks that increased rapidly. In some cases, the police registered a three- to even tenfold increase in crime across the country. For this reason, the crime rate and crime trends became and continue to be one of the most important political as well as public issues.[16]

Today, the majority of the public even believe that the overall level of crime is on the rise and not on the decrease. This certainly has to do with the instability of the governing institutions and political self-interests and some serious human rights violations by public institutions reported in Bulgarian media.[17] In this context, alternative sources of security relevant information are of utmost importance, and analysis of the relevance of citizen journalism is this context should be further explored, expanding on work on "European Citizen Journalism" as conducted in CPSI Work Package 2.3.

According to police records, Bulgaria has an under-average to average victimization level, with average social fear but high personal fear of crime.

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15 World Bank: *BULGARIA – Accelerating Bulgaria's Convergence: the Challenge of Raising Productivity,* vol. II: *Main Report,* no. 38570, July 2007, http://site resources.worldbank.org/INTBULGARIA/Resources/ABCReport_Volume_2.pdf.
16 "Bulgaria," *Crime and Society: A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World*, http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/europe/bulgaria.html.
17 "Bulgaria: Police," *Crime and Society: A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World*, http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/europe/bulgaria.html.

Public debates centre on actual security as represented by reported offences, whereas policy interventions appear to be rather based on perceived security and perceived relevance of issues in the political arena. The resulting lack of responsiveness to citizen (actual) fear of crime may be part of the explanation for the personal overfear present in Bulgaria together with a substantial correlation between media reporting and perception of crime in Bulgaria.

As a consequence, there has been little public discussion about crime and victimization data. The main focus of public debate and political intervention in the field of increasing citizens' security and decreasing perception of insecurity used to be on establishing private and public institutions along with institutionalized documentation, such as police statistics, victimization surveys and national crime surveys. Non-governmental organizations were established to conduct own surveys in order to limit the possibility of manipulation of data about factual and felt security for political reasons. These organizations started to use data from several international victimization surveys in order to evaluate and compare the Bulgarian crime level with the international (mostly European) situation. The aim also was to portray citizens' experience with crime, conduct official victimization surveys for the first time and interpret the crime situation in both subjective and objective terms.

Despite these efforts, Bulgarian society's perception of crime still appears somewhat misguided. Although some crime and victimization surveys seem to be accepted by the public, the majority have no trust in those data and do not believe that surveys do reflect reality.[18] This may be one of the reasons why Bulgarian citizens have a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and intervention in fighting crime.

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18 Center for the Study of Democracy: *Crime Trends in Bulgaria 2000-2005* (http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=7491), ch. 4: "Perceptions of Crime," http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=1793.

France

A country of initiatives

France, with a population of about 65 million is the fourth-largest Western industrialized economy. In the unitary semi-presidential republic, security is seen as a symbol of preserving the values acquired by the society as a whole. It seems that for the French government as well as citizens, the implementation of security measures and security information in are one of the most important topics in daily life. This is mirrored by both the public and the private sector putting an increasing sense of insecurity at the top of their list of concerns. Consequently, crime has become the topic of many public discussions and conversations. However, the salience of the issue of violent crime and the feeling of insecurity also appears to result from the labour market conditions in France.

French crime data rest on empirical social research and are collected annually at the level of the 95 départements by the local Police and Gendarmerie authorities. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for gathering the data and publishing the total number of offences at the local and national level of aggregation. The data describe and critically assess various instances of the crime phenomenon and summarize the information.

Irrespective of this relatively broad basis of empirical data, public interventions rather tend to focus on (in)security as perceived in the political arena. Main activities are the development of knowledge of global trends in crime, exchange information on criminal justice policies implemented in other countries, advocate its views on matters pertaining to criminal justice and the combat against crime, and engage in dialogue and multilateral cooperation. One of the main activities in this field is the development of knowledge and the exchange of information. France is not only taking part in the work underway in a number of United Nations bodies but also at the Council of Europe and the OECD, with respect to combating corruption, addressing issues of good governance in the public sector, and defining criteria for development assistance policies. France also supports a number of initiatives designed to combat cross-border crime which are being implemented at the sub-regional and regional level either by European international organizations or by the United Nations. Contributing to

drafting and implementing international standards is also an important activity. At the same time, EU is not seen as a legal frame of reference but as a provider of symbolic legitimacy for associated measures.

France has a balanced social/personal fear of crime culture, yet at the same time a citizen security culture of overfear. Measured by the "burglary item" typical of criminological surveys ("How likely do you feel you will be a victim of burglary in the coming year, e.g. your house broken into?"), the French (along with the Italian) public even is most pessimistic among the national publics covered by the case studies. The reason behind probably is that public debates typically centre on actual security and are not always well met by the government's approach of centring on the perception of (in)security issues from a political point of view. This is comparable to the situation in Bulgaria, which also has an overfear culture, so that public policy centred on perceived security, tending to be irresponsive to citizens' needs based on actual security, can again be assumed to be part of the explanation for citizens' overfear of crime. It could also be the reason behind the fact that public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems (such as video surveillance) is low, and technology is seen by the public more as a threat (or part of the problem) than a part of the solution.

Overfear may moreover account for French citizens being split in their preference for EU-based as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. The EU is a locus of fear of crime for some citizens in France, and this is matched by the mentioned reluctance of the political sector to making reference to EU in crime-related security issues beyond reasons of symbolic legitimacy.

Germany

Raised security awareness

In Germany, with a population of about 82 million and twenty years after unification, not only great steps raising the standard of living in different parts of the country have been made but also new levels of acceptance of security policy reached. Both the country's history as a "front state" in the Cold War and key driver of the international change ending that Cold War have lead to a preponderant perception of security problems as being of transnational and international nature and of security as a symbol of preserving the values acquired by the state and society as a whole.

In consequence, security has become a symbol of preparedness and ability for defence of the nation against threats from without and from within, resting on higher-ranking international values, such as democracy, rule of law and European integration. With an average level of victimization but equally low levels of personal and social fear of crime, Germany has an underfear citizen security culture. Public debates and policy interventions tend to centre more on perceived than on actual security, reflecting the symbolic character of security.

Germany's security culture is somewhat focused on the state as security provider. For example, there is a clear discrepancy between actual crime rates and public debates about internal security: Main offences based on reporting to police are theft, fraud, damage to property, assault/bodily injury and drug related crime, whereas main public and political debates centre on child abuse and domestic violence, racism-motivated violence against foreigners, right-wing extremism, violence in schools and human trafficking.

The political approach to internal security centres on prevention and is also informing German policy in the EU, which is directed to solving questions related to big crimes on a European level. Public perception and discussion of internal security typically follows that spin, confining itself to the national or European level, neglecting aspects such as urban safety and neighbourhood security. German citizens have even exhibited a preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in fighting crime although there is a tendency to perceive the EU as a cause of crime.

The latter can be seen as one of the reasons why the framing of issues as security relevant (the so-called securitization process) can still be described as largely state-sponsored, that is, it are usually state authorities that set security themes that are then picked up by public debate, rather than that public perceptions and debate would raise security concerns then picked up by the state and transformed into policies. Citizens' feeling of insecurity in terms of fear of crime thus tends to follow governmental acts of securitization. In the wake of this perceptive style, the threshold of public acceptance of state interventions and security technologies is represented by the balance between the constitutional principle of protection of privacy and individual freedom on the one hand and that of public safety and the de facto basic right to security on the other.

Although more and more people do accept extensive surveillance measures or use of security technologies in order to provide and foster security, Germans have been found to be most sceptical of CCTV, based on concern about civil liberties, or specifically privacy. Citizens even believe that is also the government's duty to take a hand in citizens' discussions about the introduction of new security technologies. Media can be said to focus on issues that people want to read or hear. As a consequence, public debates and policy interventions tend to centre more on perceived than on actual security. The tendency to believe that the citizen security is dependent on the development and use of new security technologies is absolutely present in Germany.

Italy

Comprehensive risk management

Italy, a welfare state with a population of about 60 million and the world's fifth-largest industrial economy continues to have serious problems concerning organized crime in business as well as in the political sector. Consequently, citizens perceive internal security and public safety as national tasks, including the centralization of policing and criminal justice structures. At the same time, political culture is open towards the Europeanization of the security sector due to long experience with internationally acting organized crime. However, there remains the problem of implementing European practices into action repertories of national agencies, which are often difficult to coordinate.

Most social as well as political concerns are about the uncontrolled and illegal migrations of the last years. According to the reports by national statistics bureau ISTAT, there are around 3.5 million foreigners living in Italy, around half of whom are from Eastern Europe, followed by North Africans.[19] In this context, a strong link between citizens' growing sense of insecurity and increase in the number of immigrants living in Italy exists. Italian citizens themselves think that they live in areas that have a high or medium risk of crime. Measured by the "burglary item" typical of criminological surveys ("How likely do you feel you will be a victim of burglary in the coming year, e.g. your house broken into?"), the Italian (along with the French) public is most pessimistic among the national publics covered by the case studies. Italy has in fact a strong personal fear of crime culture. This personal overfear is mirrored by social underfear.

Security interventions focus on the institutional rather than the societal sector, seeking to obtain control of certain organized crime frameworks (e.g. restructure criminal enterprises in response to changes in world markets and their regulation) and improve prevention of terrorist attacks. Italian government and security services – the Department of Public Security and the Ministry of Interior – combat these kinds of crime mostly with electronic surveillance, in particular interception of communication of criminal groups. Public debates centre on striking the right balance between individual rights to privacy and the needs of crime control, but public acceptance of technological solutions to security

problems is above average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself.

In sum, Italian public security culture can be described as a network-centred culture, closely related to the normative foundations of statehood, reflecting threats to the idea of the state as a collective security provider. Interestingly, this does not only refer to fighting organized crime but also to the national management of – sometime scattered – disaster response in the regions of the country.

As a consequence, security policy in general is guided by the political norm of comprehensive risk assessment and management at the all-national level. In line with that, one should expect Italian public opinion to be especially susceptible to information (and perturbation) from different sectors of politics and society.

Italy is the only of the countries under review by CPSI where citizens have a clear preference for European solutions to national crime problems. This may also be due to the fact that citizens' perception of the EU meaning more crime is farthest below EU average of all countries analyzed.

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19   http://www.istat.it/english/.

The Netherlands

Security crisis and internationalism

The Netherlands, with a population of about 17 million, have a history of economic and cultural wealth, religious pluralism and political tolerance. This is also reflected in the country's approach to security. The national security research programme for example seeks to grasp contributions from the national government, local governments, the business community, social organizations and citizens.

In consequence however, security has become fuzzy as a concept and, in public opinion, has been connoted with failures of both state and society to confront recent problems of crime. In particular by media influence, public perception is that security is becoming more important than other values, such as citizen rights, e.g. privacy and freedom of opinion. At the same time, technology is rather perceived by the citizens as associated with security problems than with solutions to security problems.

Emerging high public demand on policy and politics has produced a kind of permanent feeling of a security crisis. In contrast to this state of public mind, the Netherland's citizens (along with those of Sweden) are, among the national publics covered by the case studies, most optimistic about their neighbourhood security as measured by the "burglary item" typical of criminological surveys ("How likely do you feel you will be a victim of burglary in the coming year, e.g. your house broken into?").

Also in terms of criminological survey statistics, over-average victimization along with personal underfear and social overfear make the Netherlands in sum a country that has a balanced citizen fear of crime culture, but the social fear character of the security culture remains important, with immigrant cultures often interpreted as the cause of social radicalization processes that mount up to threats to internal security.

In the political culture of the Netherlands, security is interpreted as a task of the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders. This limits the scope for Europeanization, but it also results in a policy that is guided

by the interpretation of security as a sector that requires an alignment of the own national approach with that of other states and organizations.

Following the inclusive approach also chosen by the country's security research programme, the Dutch government as well as public-private partnerships work successfully in the field of crime control. The Dutch Centre for Crime Prevention & Safety (CCV) for instance has developed and implemented coherent instruments designed to enhance community safety. CCV's aim is to stimulate cooperation between public and private organizations in order to achieve a coordinated, integrated approach to crime reduction. In addition, it forms a bridge between policy and practice.

Yet still, the Netherlands citizens' feeling of insecurity remains an issue in the political discussion and the citizens themselves show a clear preference for EU as opposed to national decision-making and action in crime fighting. At the same time however, they much more than the EU average perceive the EU as meaning more crime.

Sweden

Information & security awareness

In Sweden, with a population of about 9 million, although no other country has as lower rate of poverty and social exclusion, the crime rate is high compared to other industrialized countries. At the same time, Swedish (along with Dutch) citizens are, among the national publics covered by the case studies, most optimistic about their neighbourhood security as measured by the "burglary item" typical of criminological surveys ("How likely do you feel you will be a victim of burglary in the coming year, e.g. your house broken into?"). Swedish citizen security culture in sum however seems to be unbalanced: Clear below-average personal fear of crime goes together with clear over-average social fear of crime.

Therefore, the security awareness and vulnerability are significant issues in the public, economy as well as political sectors. The social overfear is mirrored by public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems above average, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problem, and not as a security problem in itself. Citizens' preference for EU or national decision-making and action in crime fighting is fickle but the balance has recently been in favour of the EU.

Sweden is a country in which questions that are in public opinion framed as security questions are very close related to the normative foundations of statehood, reflecting threats to the idea of the state as a collective security provider. In particular, this refers to the integration of information from different sources, resulting in a predominance of national themes in debating security and interventions, however mirrored by an interest in implementing these themes along with emerging European/international standards, as well as making use of international knowledge and practices. Network-based solutions in security affairs (with respect for ethics, integrity and human rights) are a momentous theme in Sweden

Consistent with this, a very large number of Swedish citizens and actors think that the effectiveness of security technologies (particularly including information security, sensoring and network-based solutions in general) as well as interests of society play an important role in determining its acceptance. In fact, the level

of citizens' acceptance of security-enhancing interventions is closely linked with the use of new technology, reflecting Sweden's industrial strength in engineering and related high technology.

However, the development of IT and related increase in availability of security-relevant information happened more quickly than the ability to develop adequate security awareness. Public discussion have consequently been focusing on the question whether it is more difficult to protect security in modern information and communication systems that also give rise to legal problems. In addition, lack of confidence in the criminal justice system clearly influences Swedish citizens' perception of crime trends. Discussions lead to the question which kind of new security measures and law enforcement powers should be implemented in national law. Nevertheless, there is agreement that a coherent information security policy is required, and the Swedish government's overall goal is to maintain a high level of information security throughout society. Sweden is developing an information security strategy able to serve as the basis for both private and public players.

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United Kingdom

Culture of underfear in a victimized society

The United Kingdom with its population of 61 million is witnessing sensitive concerns and discussions about new security threats and measures. Variations in perception of crime that play a role here are interlinked with demographic and socio-economic factors, such as economic activity. The explanatory value of factors for mismatches between perceived and actual security is interlinked with the increase in levels of crime along with increase of population and with economic hardship and recession.

In the multi-cultural country, public security and the role of the state as security provider have been above-average framed in terms of readily available information and knowledge. This has resulted in a rise of information security policies and procedures as well as an information-based approach heavily relying on large video surveillance (CCTV) networks. The public culture of the country has even been characterized as that of a "surveillance society".[20] This fact may account for the citizens' clear preference for national as opposed to EU decision-making and action in crime fighting.

In public perception, crime levels have increased a lot over the past few years, whereas at a local level, there has been a reduction in citizens' perception of crime levels and confidence in security interventions along with trust in police has increased. After all, the UK – based on the data for England and Wales – has a fear of crime culture that can be described as an underfear citizen security culture from a European perspective: Victimization being comparatively high, personal and social fear levels are average. A reason for this may be that offences are mostly concentrated in hotspots, thus far from representing an all-nation political concern, and though some increases can be witnessed, all the main categories of the crime reports (such as violent crime, sex offences etc.) show a decrease in offences.

Public acceptance of technological solutions to security problems is high, with technology generally seen as a part of the solution of security problems, and not

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20   Leon Hempel & Eric Töpfer: *CCTV in Europe. Final Report.* Berlin: Centre for Technology and Society, Technical University Berlin, 2005, http://www.urbaneye. net/results/ue_wp15.pdf, p. 5.

as a security problem in itself. This is mirrored by the public's attitude towards crime-related security as an urgent task of the state and leads again to a distortion between perceived and actual risk of victimization: Although the recorded crime figures have been falling over the past few years and the risk of being a victim is at its lowest level ever, people still believe that the rate is in fact going up.[21]

Various government agencies aim to examine new or emerging types of crime, such as fraud and technology crimes. The experts claim that the statistics recorded by the police on fraud and technology crimes do not still provide reliable information about the extent and trends in these crimes. Consequently, many offences go unreported. But the common view is that the victimization surveys can provide information about these crimes, although sometimes the victim may not be aware that they have been a victim of these crimes like identity theft. This is an additional, institutional factor explaining the present underfear citizen security culture.

However, there are also critical interpretations of the UK's culture of underfear: Critics argue that information technology-based solutions to security problems, including video surveillance, are suited not to confront threats but only to reassure the public that something is being done. This facilitates the rise of a security culture of moral panic, such as illustrated by the London bombings in 2005. The critical point here is that the measures can be circumvented because the threat they address is too unlikely to justify the action taken against it. This feedback-loop can explain quite well how measures failing to impact crime rates can nevertheless impact perception of crime, including the level of crime reporting. In fact, a new type of intervention emerged, not directed at crime levels but at levels of public fear of crime.[22]

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21 "Great Britain," *Crime and Society: A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World*, http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/europe/great_britain.html.

22 David Garland: *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 122.

Conclusion

> *"Though public support for EU decision-making and action against crime has increased recently, the EU continues generally not to be perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime."*

In most of the countries studied by CPSI, citizens continue to perceive national interventions to be most suitable to enhance crime-related security. Though public support for EU decision-making and action against crime has increased recently, the EU continues generally not to be perceived as a locus of successful interventions to enhance citizen security against crime.

> *"CPSI country case studies have shown no consistent association between acceptance of technological solutions for security problems and relationship between level of societal and of personal fear of crime, level of victimization, relationship between felt and actual personal/social security and victimization."*

As far as technological solutions for security problems are concerned, CPSI country case studies have shown consistent association between acceptance of those solutions and cultural attitudes towards technology in general, irrespective of security concerns: Countries in which technology is interpreted as part of the security problem (e.g. critical infrastructure protection, information technology as object of offence and source of insecurity), acceptance is lower than in countries where technology is interpreted as part of the solution (e.g. information technology as a foundation for coordinated, efficient prevention and response).

CPSI country case studies have shown no consistent association between acceptance of technological solutions for security problems and relationship between level of societal and of personal fear of crime, level of victimization, relationship between felt and actual personal/social security and victimization.

> *"A clear distribution of responsibility and division of labour between the different actors in society is needed rather than increased investments. People do not believe that enhanced security technologies alone can eliminate insecurity."*

According to citizens' perceptions in the countries studied by CPSI, security-enhancing interventions should in particular include the following: Making use of the combined capacity of society, focusing on important public activities, increasing awareness of security risks and possibilities of (self-)protection and ensuring the provision of competence. We conclude from this that a clear distribution of responsibility and division of labour between the different actors in society is needed rather than increased investments. People do not believe that enhanced security technologies alone can eliminate insecurity.