The multidimensional development of ESDP as an instrument for comprehensive conflict management

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Overview

- Leading assumptions/development principles
- Pre-developments of ESDP / evolutionary principles
- Cornerstones of ESDP development
- Dimensions to track in ESDP development – narrow and broader perspective
- ESDP’s multidimensionality
- Strategic development/development of strategies
- Operational development – capability development
- Analytical considerations: in favour of realism in EU’s security governance
Leading assumptions/developmental principles

- ESDP is a subset of CFSP
- ESDP is multifunctional
- ESDP contains principles, decision-making and instruments for comprehensive conflict management
- Comprehensive conflict management is defined here as first-, second- and third-order crisis prevention
- ESDP’s practical focus so far has been, however, on short-term crisis management
- As far as ESDP is involved in third-order prevention, or post-conflict peace-building, it does not live up to its self-proclaimed standard of comprehensiveness (eg. BIH)
- Development of a long-term horizon depends on overcoming structural problems (such as the Council-Commission split)
- Typical developmental problems of ESDP have reiterated since its pre-history
- Path-dependency of current developmental challenges to ESDP
- This also means: Past compromises can intensify current cleavages
- Security and defence affairs act as an engine of European integration
Pre-developments/
Evolutionary principles
... in the EU's public diplomacy self-description:

Throughout the various stages of European integration, the concepts of a political union, a common foreign policy or even a common defence policy have regularly been put on the table through a series of policy proposals. The first attempts at a substantial transfer of competences for these sensitive policies were blocked by a minority of Member States due to the intergovernmental aspect involved. As a result, the gradual transfer of powers has been given priority since the 1970s.

In 1950, the Pleven plan aimed to create an integrated European army under joint command. This plan was the subject of negotiation between the six Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community from 1950 to 1952 and led to the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). The corollary of the EDC was a political project aimed at establishing a federal or confederative structure, presented in 1953. The 'European Political Community' would have created a two-chamber parliamentary assembly, a European Executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The Political Community was to have very wide powers and was, in the long run, to absorb the ECSC and the EDC. However, this project never came to fruition as it was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954.

At the beginning of the 1960s, tough negotiations were conducted on the basis of the two Fouchet plans which envisaged closer political cooperation, a union of states and common foreign and defence policies. A committee established to draft specific proposals produced difficult, yet nevertheless ambitious, compromises, such as the establishment of an independent secretariat or the future prospect of qualified majority voting in certain areas. Unfortunately, agreement could not be reached on the proposals of the Fouchet committee and negotiations between the Member States floundered in 1962. 
Pre-developments / evolut. principles of ESDP (2/3)

Note the appearance of defining cleavages over (then West-) European integration in defence affairs

- European Defence Community (EDC) as part of an envisaged European Political Community (EPC): Conflicting principles of integration – supranationalism vs. confederalism

- Fouchet plans as parts of an intended European Political Community (EPU): Foretaste of the deepen-or-enlarge divide; problem of pre-accession strategies in the area of common defence

- “Can European integration be complete if it does not include common defence?”
Pre-developments / evolut. principles of ESDP (3/3)

1969
European Political Co-operation (EPC)

1973
Copenhagen Summit of the newly established European Council
First extension of EPC towards common security policy: EPC shall include “common positions” in times of crisis and “joint assessments of crisis situations, with the aim of foreseeing them and taking measures needed to deal with them.”
→ Beginning of EC’s foreign/defence/security policy bi-/trifurcation

1981
Bonn-Rome initiative
Full involvement of the Commission in all EPC activities (later also applicable to CFSP and ESDP)
EPC shall include efforts to strengthen the security of the Community

1987
WEU Platform on European Security Interests
“The constitution of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.”
Intention to “develop a more cohesive European defence identity”. NAC welcomed the platform as affirming “a positive identity in the field of European security within the framework of the Atlantic alliance, conducive to the strengthening of the transatlantic partnership and of the alliance as a whole.”
→ ESDI vs. ESDP / Consultation vs. decision-making autonomy
Cornerstones of ESDP development
Cornerstones of ESDP development (1/9)

1991

**Maastricht Treaty**
establishes the responsibility of the EU in security matters within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which shall include the **“eventual framing of a common defence policy”**

WEU is transformed into the defence branch of the EU

➔ Identity, solidarity, widened concept of security

**Article J.1**

1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.

2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:

   - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
   - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
   - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
   - to promote international co-operation;
   - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Cornerstones of ESDP development (2/9)

1992
"Petersberg Declaration" at Western European Union (WEU) Foreign ad Defence Ministers Meeting
Preparedness to make available military units for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace enforcement.

1996
North Atlantic Council Meeting, Berlin
NATO decides to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. This will “permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.”

1997
Amsterdam Treaty
- Role of the European Council in ESDP (principles, common strategies)
- ESDP is a part of CFSP; it is thus a legal duty of the member states to support it (loyalty, art. 11, para. 2)
- Upgrade of CFSP instruments and extension to ESDP, e.g. common strategies
- Creation of the post of the High Representative for CSFP
- Article 17: Shift from “eventual” framing to “progressive” framing of a common defence policy
- ESDP comprises crisis management as well as contributing to the general objectives of CFSP according to article 11 (independence and security of the Union etc.)
- Incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into CFSP, the WEU remains the defence arm of the Union → coherence, activity, loyalty
“The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. [...] It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.

2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. [...] Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers).

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework). [...]”

Cornerstones of ESDP development (4/9)

1999

**Cologne Council of the G8 countries**

in the Declaration on “Strengthening the ESDP”, the member states affirm the objective of reinforcing the CFSP by giving the EU the ability to respond to crises.

“To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”

→ ESDP within the political framework of the EU, that is, linked to EU’s political decision-making system in the 2nd pillar, set-up of a European defence industry

**Helsinki Council**

- Political clearance for 2nd pillar institution-building
- **Autonomous decision-making**, and conduct of operations “where NATO as whole is not engaged”
- **Military Headline goal**: member states agree on establishing a Rapid Reaction Force capable of carrying out the full range of the Petersberg tasks. The force is to be comprised of up to 50,000-60,000 servicemen.
- Mandating: Just in accordance with UN charter, no mandatory UN mandate
Cornerstones of ESDP development (5/9)

2000

Foreign ministers meeting in Santa Maria de Feira
- First planning goal for civilian capabilities of ESDP
- Planning goals defined on conferences of the contributing countries
  → problems with verification and certification
  → in the following: increased recourse to PfP principles and mechanisms

Nice Treaty
- Institutional adjustments. PSC, EUMC, EUMS become permanent elements of CFSP/ESDP
- Call for a strengthening of ESDP to be able to conduct mission covering the whole spectrum of Petersberg tasks
- Integration of the WEU, except article 5 (common military defence)
- Council will be in charge during a crisis management operation
- PSC has some decision-making competence in crisis management (article 25)
- Full engagement of defence ministers in implementing headline goals
  → Principle of decision-making autonomy in respect of third-country contributions (force generation conference, committee of contributing countries)
Cornerstones of ESDP development (6/9)

Council Structures for ESDP Crisis Management

European Council

Council
- General Affairs Council GAC
- Committee of Permanent Representatives COREPER
- Political and Security Committee PSC
- Military Committee EUMC
- Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management CIVCOM

High Representative HR
- Secretary General SG

Secretariat
- Directorate General for External Relations DG E
  - Police Unit
  - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PPEWU
- Joint Situation Centre JCS Crisis Cells
- Military Staff EUMS
  - Civil-Military Planning Cell

*All the bodies marked with grey are new

Jakobsen (2004): 6
Cornerstones of ESDP development (7/9)

2001
European (military) Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)

Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy / Swedish Presidency Report
- Plans for co-ordinating civilian aspects of European crisis management, including strategic partnership with NATO
- Developmental aim: Union must by able to employ the full spectrum of available civil and military means for crisis management (≠ conflict management and prevention) in a coherent and co-ordinated way
- The full spectrum of means usable in ESDP comprises Community, Union and member states instruments
- Civil-military co-ordination in crisis management must be given priority in ESDP strategy and action
- Documents concerning EU strategy for co-operation in crisis management as well as participation of non-EU states
- Plan for “crisis management exercises” in civil-military crisis management
  ➔ Comprehensiveness, coherence, co-ordination, consultation and multilateralism in crisis management (based on decision-making autonomy!)

Laeken European Council
The Union declares that it is now “capable of conducting some crisis-management operations”.
However, it also emphasizes that substantial progress still needs to be made in the areas of
- Balanced Development of Military and Civilian Capabilities within ESDP
- Finalization of the Arrangements with NATO
Cornerstones of ESDP development (8/9)

9/11-Effects on ESDP

- Depreciation of the categorical "civilian"-power approach
- At the same time: increasing consciousness of non-military aspects of crisis management
- Further blurring of the border line between internal and external security
- Obvious necessity of security policy also in the sense of stabilizing weak states
- Re-boost for the idea of stability through integration (enlargement and new neighbourhood/partnership policy)
- Obvious necessity of interoperability and concentrating/pooling resources (transformation as paradigm for military policy)
- Step from crisis management to conflict management, especially prevention
Cornerstones of ESDP development (9/9)

2002
EU Foreign Ministers Meeting, Luxemburg
Non-military costs of EU military operations to be financed from a common budget, while the military costs are considered as individual costs and will be financed on a „costs lie where they fall“ basis.

European Council Seville
Scope of ESDP broadened to include the fight against terrorism

2003
European Council Brussels
- European Security Strategy (ESS) – see below
- “Action Plan” against the proliferation of WMD
- Finalizing of liaison agreements with NATO („Berlin plus“)

2004
Adoption of the Constitutional Treaty
EU heads of state and government approve Constitutional Treaty for the European Union, by entry into force the treaty enshrines the ongoing establishment of a European Defence Agency, introduces a new mechanism called “structured co-operation” between a group of member-states and commit, in the “solidarity clause” the Union’s member-states to help each other in case of an armed aggression to one of them.
Enhanced Co-operation in Defence Matters
Enhanced co-operation in defence matters is to be adopted by the Council of the EU as a last resort once it has established that the objectives of such co-operation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the EU as a whole. Enhanced co-operation in CFSP can be initiated only by a unanimous decision of the Council of the EU.

 Permanent Structured Co-operation
The draft Constitutional Treaty allows those member states "whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions" to establish permanent structured co-operation within the framework of the EU. The criteria and required commitments for participation are linked to the Helsinki Headline Goal, the Headline Goal 2010, and the activities of the European Defence Agency. Permanent structured co-operation is different from enhanced co-operation in defence matters in that the Council of the EU may act by a qualified majority.

 Solidarity Clause
The draft Constitutional Treaty further allows the EU and its member states to "act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster". In such a case, the EU is to "mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states" to prevent the terrorist threat and to assist a member state.

 Specific Provision Relating to the Common Security and Defence Policy
The draft Constitutional Treaty states that if a member state is "the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter".

Source: ESDP Online Course, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/edu/el_content/all.cfm#esdp
Widened Petersberg Tasks according to the Constitutional Treaty

- **Conflict prevention** (early warning, confidence building, security reinforcing measures, e.g. preventive deployment)
- Common disarmament measures (destruction of weapons, arms control)
- Military advice and support (co-operation with third-country armed forces or with a regional/sub-regional IO in order to build up democratic forces by exchanging best practices)
- **Post-conflict peace-building**
  - Support for the fight against terrorism on the basis of invitation by a third country

→ Includes „nearly every hypothesis except collective self defence“ (Haine, no year)
Dimensions to track in ESDP development?
Dimensions to track? (1/2)

ESDP as an effort in comprehensive conflict prevention?

“The list of EU instruments directly or indirectly relevant to the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance, economic co-operation and trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of ESDP (including information gathering for anticipating potential conflicts situations and monitoring international agreements). Through these, the EU is already heavily engaged in conflict prevention. But it can and must improve the focus and effectiveness of its action in this area. It must be able to respond in a timely and tailor-made fashion, with an appropriate mix of instruments, to the specific situations as they arise. Ultimately, this is not just a question of streamlined decision-making and management procedures but, more fundamentally, of the common political will to respond. This Communication summarises what the EU is already doing, the instruments it has at its disposal, and suggests forthcoming possible activities in conflict prevention.“


→ Council-Commission split
ESDP’s development can be politically and analytically assessed from a broader or from a narrower perspective

The precedent quotation from the Commission represents the broader perspective.

Most national communication from the EU member states represents a narrower perspective, centred on 2nd-pillar and crisis management.

Judging ESDP in terms of its self-proclaimed principles (such as “comprehensiveness” in conflict prevention and management) speaks for the broader analytical perspective – cf. Gourlay (2004); Rummel (2004)
ESDP dimensions – narrow perspective (1/3)

- Focus on ‘traditional’ foreign and security policy: diplomatic relations, policy responses to international conflicts and crises, defence policy and military co-operation
- Now known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
- Located in the Second Pillar of the EU
- Focus of much of current member states activities
- Highlights ESDP as a crisis response/consequence management mechanism
- Poses the question of whether ESDP is a policy or a (merely technical) platform
- Also poses the question of the locus of co-ordination for civil-military interaction in crisis management
ESDP dimensions – narrow perspective (2/3)

ESDP Online Course,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/edu/el_content/all.cfm#esdp
ESDP dimensions – narrow perspective (3/3)

ESDP as CFSP’s evolution from within

EU pillars and policies

Missiroli (2004): 60
ESDP dimensions – broader perspective (1/3)

- Focus on the whole range of foreign and security policies and engagements of the EU
- Includes the narrow perspective, but also policies falling under the JHA Pillar (incl. police deployments abroad) and the wide range of foreign economic policies, as well as strategic co-operation with partners and other international organizations
- The broader analytical perspective mirrors an increasing realization in the EU that foreign and security policies are ‘cross-pillar’ affairs
- Examines ESDP in terms of comprehensive conflict management
- Makes ESDP harder to study, but is what is relevant from the perspective of multilateralism as well as from external actor’s perspectives
Objectives include

- encouragement of regional co-operation and integration
- promotion of human rights
- promotion of democracy and good governance
- prevention of violent conflicts
- fight against international crime

Instruments and types of policies include

- all CFSP actions and policies
- Justice and Homeland Affairs (3rd Pillar) actions and policies
- external economic policy (tariffs, quota, etc.)
- economic agreements, associations
- economic aid, economic sanctions
- conditionality
- membership perspective
Multiple dimensions for tracking ESDP developments

- Legal institution according to title V of the EU treaty as one of the instruments of CFSP
- Capability initiatives of the European Council
  - Helsinki Headline Goal, Civilian Headline Goal
- Common Defence Policy (article 17 of the EU treaty)
  - Based on common bodies and capabilities;
  - Especially civil-military co-ordination (CMCO)
- Common Defence Policy (article 17 of the EU treaty)
  - According to evolutionary clause; EDA, civil-military cell at EUMS and battle groups as possible core
- Component of pillar-overarching EU peace policy
  - In the sense of the European Commission
- European Security Strategy (ESS)
  - Principle- and norm-setting enterprise of the Secretary General/High Representative of ESDP
- National and multinational action of the member states
  - As actors of EU’s 2nd pillar; national constructions and perceptions of ESDP
**ESDP: A case for multi-pillar development tracking**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Crisis Management across the EU’s three pillars</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar one</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long term or structural conflict prevention: development assistance, post-conflict peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short-term crisis management: Civil protection, training and financing of the ESDP.</td>
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Jacobsen (2004): 6
Strategic development/
Development of strategies

The Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats
- Global Challenges
- Key Threats
  - Terrorism
  - Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
  - Regional Conflicts
  - State Failure
  - Organised Crime

Strategic Objectives
- Addressing the Threats
- Building Security in our Neighbourhood
- An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism

Policy Implications for Europe
- More Active
- More Capable
- More Coherent
- Working with Partners

Æ External action for internal consolidation
Examples of ESDP strategies (2/3)

EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2003)
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf
Responsibility of the Secretary General/High Representative

“To address with unceasing determination the threat posed by WMD a broad approach covering a wide spectrum of actions is needed. Our approach will be guided by:

- our conviction that a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order and hence our commitment to uphold, implement and strengthen the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements;
- our conviction that non-proliferation should be mainstreamed in our overall policies, drawing upon all resources and instruments available to the Union; […]
- verification and upholding of compliance with these treaties;
- our view that increased efforts are needed to enhance consequence management capabilities and improve coordination; […]
- our commitment to co-operate with the United States and other partners who share our objectives.

At the same time, the EU will continue to address the root causes of instability including through pursuing and enhancing its efforts in the areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of poverty and promotion of human rights.” (para. 14)
Examples of ESDP strategies (3/3)

**EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (Update, June 2005)**


**Responsibility of the European Council**

The plan mainly includes: Justice and home affairs, financing of terrorism, civil protection and protection of critical infrastructure as well as

**External relations**

"The EU continued its dialogue with the relevant regional organisations and with Euromed partners. Co-operation in combating terrorism was included in the action plans approved by the Union and its partners in the framework of the new Neighbourhood Policy. The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Commission encouraged regional coordination in this area." (p. 9)

**ESDP**

ESDP dimension in the fight against terrorism is "living" and should be adjusted regularly (p. 10) It rests on the following principles:
- solidarity between EU Member States;
- voluntary nature of Member States' contributions;
- clear understanding of the terrorist threat and full use of available threat analysis;
- cross pillar co-ordination in support of the EU common aim in the fight against terrorism;
- co-operation with relevant partners;
- complementary nature of the ESDP contribution, in full respect of Member States' responsibilities in the fight against terrorism and with due regard to appropriateness and effectiveness considerations.
Practical/operational developments
Current ESDP operations and activities

- EUFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EU PAT FYROM
- Future ESDP Op. in Kosovo?
- BAM Moldova/Ukraine
- BAM Georgia
- EUJUST LEX Iraq
- AMM Indonesia
- EU BAM Rafah Palestinian Territories
- EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories
- Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief global
- EUSEC RD DRC
- EUPOL KINSHASA DRC
- Support to AMIS II Sudan

http://www.bmlv.gv.at/download_archiv/ppt/esvp_powerpoint_e.ppt#628,11,ESDP Operations and Activities
ESDP capability development
Civilian Capabilities of ESDP (Civilian Headline Goal 2008)

**Police Capabilities**
5,000 police officers for international missions by 2003, 1,000 of which should be available at 30 days' notice.

**Rule of Law**
200 officials comprising legal, judicial, and prosecution experts, with lead elements to be deployable within 30 days.

**Civilian Administration**
A pool of experts able to take on civil administration assignments, including administrative functions, such as elections, taxation, customs services; social functions, such as education, social services, health and medical services; and infrastructure functions, such as water and energy supply. No targets were set in this field.

**Civil Protection**
Intervention teams of up to 2,000 people for major natural, technological, and environmental emergencies. EU efforts in the civilian arena were successful with regard to police capabilities, where targets were realized ahead of schedule. Before launching its first military operation, the EU took over the International Police Task Force (IPTF) from the United Nations (UN) and deployed the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003.

(Source: ESDP Online Course)
Military Capabilities: The Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010

At the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, the EU decided to set up a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2003. In particular, EU member states should be able to: "...deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50'000-60'000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces."

In 2004, the European Council endorsed the Headline Goal 2010, which builds on the Helsinki Headline Goal and recognizes that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed. [...] A key element of the Headline Goal 2010 is the creation by 2007 of nine rapidly deployable battle groups, with 1'500 troops each, for deployment to international hotspots. The battle groups are to be ready to respond to a UN request anywhere in the world within 15 days and should be able to secure an area for up to 30 days, possibly three months. The plan also calls for the EU to coordinate strategic lift equipment by 2005, with fully efficient air, land, and sea strategic lift capabilities by 2010, and to make available an aircraft carrier with an air wing and escort by 2008.

(Source: ESDP Online Course)
Analytical considerations:
In favour of realism in EU’s security governance
Some current developmental facts of ESDP to match…

“Defence” has become a misleading term within the ESDP system, for its development and functioning are guided by the principle of comprehensive crisis (or even conflict) management (or even prevention).

ESDP does not only link military and civilian crisis management and conflict management/prevention but also internal and external dimensions of security, making ESDP first, second and third pillar related. This overarching is also represented in the ESS definition of threat (see Bretherton/Vogler 2006, pp. 208-12).

It is furthermore a political decision in which framing the EU makes use of its civilian crisis management and conflict management/prevention assets – e.g. as Community activity or as ESDP action (eg. the conflict about the framing of the Aceh Monitoring Mission).

→ Challenge of coherence – also in terms of analysis
... in favour of analytical realism (1/3)

- **Structural realism** can explain the main steps in ESDPs’ evolution within the EU/CFSP as well as ESDP’s positioning vis-à-vis the security problematique that the EU as a globalizing actor is facing.

- **Strategic culture is not necessarily an argument against a realist approach to security and defence integration** (cf. Johnston 1995):
  Identifying “constructive”/“constitutive” elements in the formation of an ESDP strategic culture does not necessarily mean that this culture itself is “constructivist” (Meyer 2005) rather than “rationalist”.

- **Why did ESDP move to “comprehensiveness” although this implies a shadow of the future?**
  “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.” (Waltz 1979: 126)
  Thus, states exploit international change to obtain positions that allow them to maximize their security in all respects. Given the broad range and diversification of security threats, states see themselves confronted with the challenge of immense investments to make when they seek to maintain, if not improve their international position, thus maximizing their security.

  This leads to new-type processes of EU-internal and external balance-of-power formation as well as to securitizing new policy areas such as civil conflict management, conflict prevention, post-conflict peace building and democratization. The internal conflict in setting up the Aceh Monitoring Missions (see Braud/Grevi 2005) illustrated this type of processes.
... in favour of analytical realism (2/3)

• However, why then is it obviously the case that ESPD rather develops on the basis of capability initiatives and flexibilization than on the basis of political concepts of integration?

States remain interested in immediate returns of co-operation, seeking to exploit international institutions' derivative functions, at the same time limiting their own investments and retaining the right and possibility of a self-interested policy. States may be interested in pooling of capabilities in order to improve their national ability to act despite scarce national resources/capabilities (cf. Grieco 1988: 498-501). Cf. also economic realism's tenet that actors strive for gaining power resources rather than immediate capabilities (Gilpin 1987). A good example is anticipated permanent structured co-operation in form of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the battle groups.

• Why then are states so eager to make well-identifiable specific national contributions to ECAP?

Once states co-operate, they live in permanent fear that others could relatively gain more from the co-operation as they themselves do. They consequently develop an interest in making specific investments whose gains they will be best able to exploit (Grieco 1988). This explains – from a realist perspective! - the states interest in making official national pledges to developing international institutional arrangements and in establishing verification mechanisms. Good examples are provided by the Military Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 process (http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf) as well as the Civilian Headline Goal Process 2008 (http://ue.eu.int/showPage.asp?id=278&lang=de&mode=g).
Finally, ESDP’s evolution of the typical basis of re-forming ad-hoc coalitions or avant-garde bilateralisms (such as the British-French St. Malo initiative) can, from a realist point of view, be assessed to represent a strength, not a problem (e.g. minimizes the risk of free riding) – as long as this process follows the ESS principle of “effective multilateralism” (that also means it is embedded into the ESDP acquis reached so far) and is based on a thorough analysis of the developmental challenges posed for ESDP by the case in point (see also Gurgul/Sieczak 2005).

See also Waltz (1979: 128): “The expectation is not that a balance, one achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another. Balances of power recurrently form. […] [S]tates will imitate each other and become socialized to their system.”
Selected bibliography
Selected bibliography

Selected bibliography

Thank you!