

GARNET (6th EU Framework Programme)

Vertices of Conflict and Cooperation: Threat Perception into the 21st Century

Germany –

Threatened by the evil in the world. From a reluctant power to an active peace donator?

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1. Assertive peace policy: From multilateralism to multinationalism with national visibility

Political science analyses of post-Cold War German foreign and security policy typically resume the leitmotif that everything remains different: that is, they end up in claiming new sea-changing challenges to and changes in German policy, at the same time concluding that these very alterations result from the constant of German civil and self-restraining strategic culture.¹ An example of this bias is the geo-strategic slant of many studies on united Germany's foreign and security policy: After the dilution of the Cold War's borderlines in Europe, quite a view authors continued to analyse German security strategy in terms of responses to structural pressure which Germany as "Macht in der Mitte Europas" (power in the centre of Europe) continued to be exposed to.² Thus, the bunch of research came to centre on the "normalization" of "new" Germany's foreign and security policy – normalization, however, extending over a broad spectrum from an enlightened power in the service of Kantian democratic peace to a Waltzian power choosing to seize any opportunity to safeguard, if not improve, its position in the international system.

Anglo-Saxon observers, judging united Germany's political as well as intellectual discourses about an appropriate place in the new security landscape, early came to

¹ Overviews of newer developments in German foreign and security policy include Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Scott Erb, *German Foreign Policy. Navigating a New Era* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2003); Volker Rittberger (ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001); Douglas Webber (ed.), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy Since Unification* (London: Cass, 2001). For an invaluable account on the intellectual foundations and path-dependencies of West German foreign Policy, see Julian Lider, *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought. 1949-1966* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986) and Julian Lider, *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought. 1966-1986* (Aldershot: Gower, 1988).

² Cf. Wolfgang F. Schlör, *German Security Policy. An Examination of the Trends in German Security Policy in a New European and Global Context* (London, Brassey's, 1993).

conclude that the country was at best reluctant, if not unable to take up position and define national interests in the post-Cold War international arena.³ Thus, Germany's self-proclaimed "culture of restraint", which was in the first place meant to alleviate anticipated fears on the side of neighbouring states about a new "Greater Germany", rather provoked reproaches of irresponsibility and check-book diplomacy. This discrepancy between self-image and outside perceptions was to a considerable extent nurtured by the then-prevailing structural realist prediction that it would be a "structural anomaly" if united Germany was not to choose to become a great power.⁴ In this vein, policy analyses at first expected united Germany to develop a security strategy portraying the country as a "big power with many options"⁵, free and able to choose the instruments that corresponded to its "geopolitical ripening"⁶.

Over the years, one could in fact observe that German politics were taking a swift from a strategy of pursuing its national interest *in* international institutions to pursuing its national interests *within* international institutions. Multilateralism as former West Germany's elixir of life had been changing to multilateralism as a strategic choice. As well did the minting self-proclaimed role model of a "civilian power" that also echoed from political science analyses of Germany's foreign and security policy. Still, also multilateralism as a strategic choice seems to produce a value-laden rather than interest-driven security policy. Equating a value-driven security policy with societally based beliefs about adequate and just role sets for Germany in international affairs, constructivism can be said to have become the dominant strand for interpreting Germany's strategic choices over the last then years. An exemplar is Peter Katzenstein's contribution to strategic culture research.⁷ It investigates domestic-societal prerequisites for the formation of national security strategy. In Katzenstein's framework, a sociological concept of norms is central, describing collective external expectations for adequate behaviour that confront actors of a certain identity. In the German case, then, it may be said that the leading constitutive norm, defining the country's security identity vis-à-vis others is that of a civilian power. The leading regulative norm, setting the standard for adequate behaviour within this constitutive context, is multilateralism – the choice of institutions as a means of action.

³ E.g. Timothy Ash, 'Germany's Choice,' *Foreign Affairs*, 73:4 (1994), pp. 65-81; Philip H. Gordon, 'Berlin's Difficulties. The Normalization of German Foreign Policy,' *Orbis*, 38:2 (1994), pp. 225-243; Alan Sked, 'Cheap Excuses. Germany and the Gulf Crisis,' *The National Interest*, no. 24 (1991), pp. 51-60.

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics,' *International Security*, 18:2 (1993), pp. 44-79 (p. XX).

⁵ Jeffrey T. Bergner, 'Unified Germany: A Great Power with Many Options,' in Gary L. Geipel (ed.), *Germany in a New Era* (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1993), pp. 183-198.

⁶ Ronald D. Asmus, 'The Future of German Strategic Thinking,' in Gary L. Geipel (ed.), *Germany in a New Era* (Indianapolis, ID: Hudson Institute, 1993), pp. 137-181 (pp. 169-176); see also James Sperling, 'German Security Policy in Post-Yalta Europe,' in M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh (eds.), *German Unification* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 261-284.

⁷ Peter Katzenstein (ed.): *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Yet another cultural aspect in security policy is often overlooked: Ideational, normative and perceptive influences on the definition of principles governing the choice of institutions. This is the aspect of “culture in action” as Ann Swidler put it.⁸ Indeed, what is the actual challenge to Germany’s strategic culture is the remaining need for a decision of general principle. To choose institutionalism and multilateralism as context for national security policy is nowadays neither sufficient to define security interests nor to derive practical security strategies. Germany’s self-restraint and lack of clear intellectual foundations for its security strategy are nicely mirrored in the fact that the country avails of an elaborate, assertive action plan for civil crisis management and conflict prevention, clearly setting out interests and deriving strategies, whereas it continues to lack an update on its defence white paper, which dates back to 1994.

This culture however has not been immune to change. Rather, it seems to be changing from *multilateralism* to *multinationalism* – that is, to assertive peace policy. Not does Germany’s strategic culture owe this change to the wake of September 11 but in fact to the experience of the wars of Yugoslav secession and their aftermaths, with the Kosovo conflict and intervention of 1999 in the first place.⁹ From “Kosovo” emerged a new consensus within the governmental coalition that peace policy needs to include military action as the ultimate instrument.¹⁰ This emerging instrumental consensus also furthered the evolving public discussion of the spectrum of security threats the country was going to face.

2. Perceptions of security threats and their geographic source

2.1 *The usual threats with soft additions*

German academic elite’s current views on impending security threats find themselves most prominently articulated in the *Internationale Politik*, a Foreign-Ministry sponsored journal whose approach it is to identify international security topics and then collect contributions that suggest Germany position itself towards these topics in one or another way. In its 2004 volume, *Internationale Politik* identified the following security threats without ranking:

- Proliferation of nuclear weapons into rogue states as well as into the hands of terrorists.¹¹ There is, however, a considerable tendency in the German academic

⁸ Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,’ *American Sociological Review*, 51:2 (1986), pp. 273-286.

⁹ Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?,’ *German Politics*, 10: 1 (2001), pp. 19-35; Jeffrey Lantis, ‘The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo,’ *Comparative Strategy*, 21:1 (2002), pp. 21-46; Steve Wood, ‘German Foreign and Security Policy After Kohl and Kosovo,’ *Government and Opposition*, 37:2 (2002), pp. 250-270.

¹⁰ For a concise examination of the related change in German security policy fundamentals after the Cold War see Erb, *German Foreign Policy*, p. 147-182.

¹¹ Sebastian Harnisch, ‘Transatlantische Kooperation tut Not. Europa, die USA und die Massenvernichtungswaffen,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:1 (2004), pp. 19-25; see also Sebastian

elite to view nuclear proliferation as a proximate, not an ultimate source of insecurity. In this perspective, nuclear proliferation threats represent a culmination point of underlying societal and cultural disparities in relation to the Western world.¹²

- Proliferation of nuclear as well other (biological, chemical) kinds of weapons of mass destruction.¹³
- The Greater Middle East as a region of protracted conflict and authoritarian rule as breeding ground for geographically extending Islamist terrorism¹⁴ as well as the pivot region for credible Euro-Atlantic politics of regional-order building, thus contributing to peaceful international relations.¹⁵
- Political terrorism in and beyond the Greater Middle East.¹⁶
- Terrorism as a strategy of asymmetric warfare, representing the contemporary variant of “devastating war”.¹⁷
- Continuing instability in Europe’s rim regions, especially the Southern Balkans.¹⁸
- Obstacles to global and European energy supply.¹⁹

The *Friedensgutachten* (“peace report”), a well-established yearbook focusing on threats to and strategies of peace, identifies the following impending threats to German security as well as international peace:²⁰

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (here, however, the *Friedensgutachten*’s assessment is that the level of threat is currently levelling out)
- Failing states and bad government
- Endangered peace processes in regions of protracted conflict

Harnisch, ‘German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict,’ *German Politics*, 13:1 (2004), pp. 1-34; Harald Müller, ‘Warum die Bombe? Die nuklearen Mächtegegne Iran und Nordkorea,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:1 (2004), pp. 12-18; Hennig Riecke, ‘Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Im Aufwind oder in der Krise,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:1 (2004), pp. 1-11.

¹² Cf. Thomas Weihe, ‘Iran: Der Atomkonflikt ist nur die Spitze des Eisbergs,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:11-12 (2004), pp. 25-26.

¹³ Cf. Harnisch, ‘Transatlantische Kooperation tut Not’.

¹⁴ Cf. Reinhard Hesse, ‘Fliehkräfte des Fortschritts. Ausblicke auf den Nahen und Mittleren Osten der kommenden Jahrzehnte,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:7 (2004), pp. 1-9.

¹⁵ Cf. Volker Perthes, ‘Die neue Zentralität des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens. Konsequenzen für Wissenschaft und Politik,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:7 (2004), pp. 49-52.

¹⁶ Cf. Ernst-Otto Czempel, ‘Der politische Terrorismus,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:7 (2004), pp. 74-81.

¹⁷ Cf. Herfried Münkler, ‘Terrorismus heute. Die Asymmetrisierung des Krieges,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:2 (2004), pp. 1-11.

¹⁸ Cf. Marie-Janine Calic, ‘Herausforderung Kosovo. Die Europäer müssen sich noch stärker engagieren,’ *Internationale Politik*, 59:11-12 (2004), pp. 95-102.

¹⁹ Cf. Frank Umbach, ‘Internationale Energiesicherheit zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts,’ in Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (ed.), *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergänzungsband 1* (Hamburg et al.: Mittler, 2004), pp. 345-370; see also Frank Umbach, ‘Global Energy Supply and Geopolitical Challenges,’ in Francois Godement, Françoise Nicolas and Taizo Yakushiji (eds.), *Asia and Europe. Cooperating for Energy Security* (Paris: IFRI, 2004), pp. 137-168.

²⁰ Christoph Weller, Ulrich Ratsch, Reinhard Mutz, Bruno Schoch and Corinna Hauswedell (eds.), *Friedensgutachten 2004* (Münster et al.: Lit, 2004), pp. 33-121.

This academic assessment extensively corresponds to the threat assessments in leading daily newspapers:²¹ The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* regularly makes terrorism, “the” nuclear threat and destabilizing effects of an EU accession of Turkey subjects of discussion.²² The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* joins the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in communicating “terrorism” and “Turkey” as primary threats to European stability but adds climate change and environmentally caused catastrophes.²³ The *Welt* similarly dedicates articles to nuclear terrorism, militant Islamism and North Korean Nuclear conflict,²⁴ just as does the *Financial Times Deutschland*²⁵. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the print elite tends to threat the treat of institutional instability in Europe, such as asserted disintegrative consequences of Turkey’s EU accession, as a security threat in the narrow sense of the word.

Political science analyses do not greatly derive from this pattern but usually place the terrorist threat on top of the security agenda.²⁶ Looking for a possible 9/11-effect on the security perception on the academic elite’s side, one could conclude that regional destabilization on the periphery of Europe has been replaced by globalized threats as the primary frame.

The government’s threat perception²⁷ as summarized in table 1 centres on international terrorism and asymmetric warfare,²⁸ the risks of failing democratic transformation in Greater Europe, environmental degradation as a threat to human security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction²⁹ and a destabilizing amassing of conventional weapons

²¹ Volker Heins, ‘Germany’s New War: 11 September and Its Aftermath in German Quality Newspapers,’ *German Politics*, 11:2 (2002), pp. 128-146.

²² Top hits of a search in <http://www.fazarchiv.faz.net> on 28 February 2005.

²³ Cf. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/250/35215>;
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/tt211/ausland/artikel/895/47848>;
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirl1/wirtschaft/artikel/836/45791>;
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/548/44504>;
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/558/44514>.

²⁴ Hits of a search in <http://www.welt.de> on 28 February 2005.

²⁵ Cf. <http://www.ftd.de/pw/in/1107770951236.html?nv=rs>;
<http://www.ftd.de/pw/in/1108191845396.html?nv=cptn>;
<http://www.ftd.de/pw/in/1108037356295.html?nv=rs>.

²⁶ Cf. Christian Simon, ‘International Terrorism - The German Response,’ in Joonas Sipilä et al. (eds.), *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian Laitos, 2004), pp. 67-72; Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), *Herausforderung Terrorismus* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004),.

²⁷ Paradigmatic texts are: Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor der 58. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, in New York am 24. September 2003, <http://www.bundeskanzler.de/Reden-.7715.531138/Bundeskanzler-Schroeder-vor-der-Generalversammlu...htm>; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Defence Policy Guidelines,’ Berlin, 21 May 2003, [http://www.bmvg.de/C1256F1200608B1B/vwContentByKey/W268AHEH510INFOEN/\\$File/VPR_en.pdf](http://www.bmvg.de/C1256F1200608B1B/vwContentByKey/W268AHEH510INFOEN/$File/VPR_en.pdf).

²⁸ ‘Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung Dr. Peter Struck im Rahmen des 21st International Workshop on Global Security: A Broader Concept of Security for the 21st Century, 8 May 2004 in Berlin,’ <http://www.bmvg.de/C1256F1200608B1B/CurrentBaseLink/N264X9PD152MMISDE>.

²⁹ Deutsche Bundesregierung (ed.), *Aktionsplan 2004 “Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung”* (Berlin 2004), pp. 16-18. An English version, entitled *Action Plan 2004 “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building”* is available at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/download/pdf/friedenspolitik/AP%20EN.pdf>.

as a result of failing security sector reform.³⁰ Failing security sector reform, in the government's view, directly contributes to the privatization of violence and the reproduction of war as a type of business organization, the boundary to organized crime being fluid. It is the government's strategy to confront this threat by promoting civil economic and social development, the prerequisite of which is the respective states' functioning monopoly on the use of force. Thus, security sector reform is seen as a key prerequisite for peace and sustainable development and centres on civilian control of the armed forces and democratic policing.

The order of priority however is debated within the government. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs follows the idea that war economy and deprivation of the chances to benefit from the promises of globalization nurtures terrorism in the Greater Middle East, it usually ranks failing states and underdevelopment first. Thus, it perceives the danger of spillover effects from non-military threats into hard security threats to be predominant. The Ministry of Defence, in contrast, has clearly ranked proliferation of weapons of mass destruction first over the past few years,³¹ since 9/11 along with terrorist attacks. As for a 9/11-effect on the side of the government, one may come to the same conclusion as in respect of the academic elite: A shift from the perceived prime challenge of stabilizing Europe's periphery to meeting globalized security threats.³²

All parties represented in the Bundestag rallied round the government's proclaimed unconditional solidarity with the U.S. after 9/11, but when it came to discuss actual actions in response to international terrorism, there burst out deeply rooted differences in threat perception – also within the group of the Red-Green coalition's members of parliament themselves. The largest opposition party, the centre-right Christian Democrat Union (CDU/CSU) was in favour of chancellor Schröder's motion to take part in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and elsewhere with Bundeswehr troops. In contrast, a minority of the coalition parties' members of parliament, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens, was strictly opposed to any counter-terrorism resorting to military means. This minority was large enough to face the Schröder government with the discomfiture of having to rely on opposition votes in order to make its motion pass. To avoid such an outcome, Schröder decided to link the vote about a Bundeswehr deployment with the question of confidence in his government – to the result that most of the MPs in the government parties' camp finally voted in favour of the deployment, even if they after all opposed it, whereas a considerable number of opposition MPs rejected Schröder's motion though approving a Bundeswehr deployment.³³

³⁰ E.g. *Aktionsplan 2004*, pp. 40-43.

³¹ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Bestandsaufnahme*.

³² Cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 'Defence Policy Guidelines,' para. 18.

³³ On this issue see Franz Oswald, 'German Security After 9/11,' in Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex (eds.), *European Security after 9/11* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 90-106 (p. 92-94).

Conversely, looking at the level of general threat perception, there are no deep dividing lines. In her speech on the Munich Security Conference 2005 for example, Angela Merkel, the leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, mentioned terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failing states as the security threats of the 21st century.³⁴ Of these three, international terrorism tends to be taken for the top challenge by the CDU/CSU because it requires common action by a European Union developing into a credible security actor within the trans-Atlantic security community. This makes it clear that there is by now a sort of trans-partisan basic consensus about the necessity to consider a broad spectrum of risk factors when talking about security. All parliamentary parties, including the Greens as well as the left-wing pacifist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), nowadays acknowledge meeting asymmetric threats as a fundamental task for German security policy.³⁵

Public interest in security and defence policy has steadily increased in the past three years, even if it has not yet reached its peak of autumn 2001 in the wake of 9/11. However, interest in the activities of the armed forces has not profited from this increase, which may be a sign for a public's differentiating between security and military affairs. According to an EMNID survey of 2002, combating terrorism is among the top ten general political tasks for Germany to accomplish, ranking on place five (28 per cent) as compared to place eight in 2001.³⁶ However, the prime threats to Germany and its society continue, in the public perception, to stem from domestic factors, such as endangered workplaces (79 per cent) and collapse of the welfare state (32 per cent). Organized crime as a borderline threat between domestic and trans-national origin ranks on place two (34 per cent), whereas securing peace in Europe ranks on place nine (14 per cent) on the security agenda, right after saving our environment.

Looking at public perception of the biggest risks to European as opposed to German security leaves us with the following top-five internationally-based threats according to the 2002 EMNID survey:³⁷

- International terrorism (32 per cent)
- Trans-national criminality (11 per cent)
- Violent conflict and general danger of war (8 per cent)
- Immigration and too many foreigners (6 per cent)
- Weapons of mass destruction (5 per cent)

A survey by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation conducted in late 2003 yielded the following top five threat perceptions in the German public:³⁸

³⁴ http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=145&

³⁵ 'Sicherheitspolitische Positionen der Bundestagsparteien,' in *IDS Info-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik*, April 2005, p.2-3.

³⁶ Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation, *Demoskopische Umfragen zur Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik in Deutschland* (Strausberg, 2003), p. 13.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

- International terrorism (69 per cent)
- Radical Moslems and Islamist fundamentalism (50 per cent)
- Weapons of mass destruction (43 per cent)
- Instability in the Middle East (32 per cent)
- Consequences of environmental pollution and climate change (27 per cent)

The figures show that in contrast to the perceptions of the government, of the academic and of the parliamentary elite, public perception in 2002 did not contain a geographic locus of threat and comprised both hard and soft security threats as well as threats to social security. Remarkably, the EMNID survey found 12 percent of the population to believe that there was no threat to European security present. An imminent danger of threats based on proliferation of weapons of mass destructions came last in the public opinion of 2002, whereas academic and political elites already then perceived it as a primary-rank threat. This is an especially interesting result compared to the public opinion of the mid-1990ies, where proliferation of all kinds of weapons came first, followed by environment-related threats, illegal immigration, collapsing export markets, scarcity in raw materials and ethnic conflict.

Comparing the 2002 EMNID results to the Adenauer Foundation Study of 2003, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that in many aspects, public threat perception seems to follow the defining practice of the government – for public opinion immediately reflected the government’s definition of the Middle East as a geographic origin and fundamentalism as an ideational origin of security threats. At the same time, there seems to be a tendency in public opinion to be responsive to focal international crises, such as the Iraq conflict. Independently of that, international terrorism has become a stable response set in public surveys when asking about the first-rank security threat of our times.

2.2 Sources of threat: Global, trans-national and oriental

The academic elite commonly perceive threats to emerge from trans-national terrorist networks as well as from the Southern Balkans, the Greater Middle East, Islamist countries and North Korea. There are nevertheless some remarkable perceptual differences, for example as for the source of weapons of mass destruction proliferation threats. Some authors clearly locate it in the Greater Middle East’s Islamic countries,³⁹ some within the entire “axis of evil” coined by US president George W. Bush,⁴⁰ whereas others classify the threat as trans-national, terrorist-network based. There is also a view that identifies weak international institutions as ultimate, structural source of the WMD

³⁸ Viola Neu, *Die Deutschen und die Außen- und Europapolitik. Eine Umfrage der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2004), p. 15, http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_4205_1.pdf.

³⁹ Cf. Weihe, ‘Iran’.

⁴⁰ Cf. Müller, ‘Warum die Bombe?’; Frank Umbach, ‘The North Korean Nuclear State,’ *Transatlantic Internationale Politik*, 5:1 (2004), pp. 79-83.

proliferation threat.⁴¹ As far as terrorist threats in general are concerned, there is the widespread opinion that they are primarily non-state and arise from protracted conflicts as well as authoritarian social and political rule in the Greater Middle East.⁴² However, as far as German academics regard terrorism as a strategy of asymmetric warfare, they consequently do not identify a geographic source of threat but attribute it to structural characteristics of the new century's "new wars".⁴³

As a further example, the contributions in *Internationale Politik* centre on "irregional", structural sources of threat. They arise either from a combination of state and non-state rogue actors combined with faint international institutions, such as in the case of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,⁴⁴ or from violent-laden structures of dependency, underdevelopment and scarcity of economic resources other than warlordship and the like⁴⁵. Concerning political reform as a regional security strategy, the *Internationale Politik* however focuses clearly on the Greater Middle East.⁴⁶ International Terrorism's sources of threat, in the *Internationale Politik*'s view, are not regionally located in the Middle East or Islamist Countries but are a trans-national, network-like phenomenon.⁴⁷ In contrast, the *Friedensgutachten 2004* to the largest extent focuses on the Greater Middle East as unifying source of Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states and collapsing peace processes.

The government's awareness here clearly differs from that of the academic elite. Just as Germany does with its national interests in world politics, it also does not in the first place define the sources of perceived security threats in geographic terms or in respect to certain world regions. Rather, in identifying sources of threats, the government employs somewhat principled scales. For example, the Defence Policy Guidelines of 2003 maintain that German security policy needs to be designed independently from territorial categories and be able to confront threats "wherever they emerge".⁴⁸ Moreover, the government typically does not consider crisis areas as independent from each other but within a larger context. As did almost all its predecessors, also the Red-Green coalition believes that German interests, also in the security realm, are essentially interwoven interests. Thus, defining them is not feasible without taking into account the perceptions and interests of allies and partner countries.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, within the government there has been a certain tendency over the last one or two years to focus on the Mediterranean Sea as Europe's connection area to the

⁴¹ Cf. Riecke, 'Nichtverbreitungspolitik'.

⁴² Cf. Hesse, 'Fliehkräfte des Fortschritts'.

⁴³ Cf. Münkler: 'Terrorismus heute'; Herfried Münkler, *Die neuen Kriege*, 2. Ed. (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2002).

⁴⁴ *Internationale Politik*, 59:1 (2004), dedicated to "Proliferation".

⁴⁵ *Internationale Politik*, 59:11-12 (2004), dedicated to "Developmental Policy".

⁴⁶ *Internationale Politik*, 59:7 (2004), dedicated to "Reforms for the Middle East".

⁴⁷ *Internationale Politik*, 59:2 (2004), dedicated to "Terrorism".

⁴⁸ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 'Defence Policy Guidelines,' para. XX.

⁴⁹ Alexander Siedschlag, 'Allein und gemeinsam. Die Sicherheit Deutschlands und die Einigung Europas,' *Y. - Magazin der Bundeswehr*, 3:12 (2003), pp. 14-18.

regional sources of 21st century security threats. Thus, there is a propensity to regard the Greater Middle East as top geographic source of European security hazards,⁵⁰ just as an important part of the academic elite does. The ministry of defence in contrast insists of the globalized nature of threats and their sources, making this assessment its point for maintaining that meeting these threats must also not stop on borders but be a combined endeavour of domestic and foreign and defence policy.⁵¹

Parliamentary opinion as a whole seems to converge to the view that if the threats have not geographic but structural sources, they are perceived to be “terrorist” or “asymmetric” as such and not explicitly linked to geographic spheres of origin.⁵² In public opinion, as seen above, the perception of current security threats as “de-territorized”, global-origin threats prevails. Therefore, the government actors seem not to be meeting with much parliamentary or public response in their upcoming propensity to communicate the Greater Middle East as the outstanding geographic source of threat.

3. Responses to threat: Multilateralism, EU-centeredness and national impact

3.1 Peace policy as a cross-cutting task requiring international embeddedness

For Germany, international institutions traditionally provide constitutive, not just regulative norms: they are important building parts for the national identity in foreign and security affairs, which serves as frame of reference for defining threats and deriving strategies to meet those threats. The 2003 defence policy guidelines accordingly state: “The multinational integration of Germany and the Bundeswehr has become a constitutive characteristic of German security policy.”⁵³ At the same time, this constitutive multinationalism led to the formation of a specific repertory of action that early became typical of then-West Germany’s strategic culture and still exhibits its path-dependencies. This repertory of action runs out to the following aphorism: Do not define clear-cut definitions of threat or national security interests but develop a manageable size of maxims that allow pragmatically fitting your own security and defencing policy effectively into international developments.⁵⁴ Both the ideational and the strategic factor favour a continuation of the leitmotif of multilateralism also under the conditions of newly emerging security challenges.

⁵⁰ ‘The Near and Middle East - Considerations from a European Viewpoint,’ Speech by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer at the Herzliya Conference, 17 December 2003, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=5200; Speech of Joschka Fischer on the Munich Security Conference 2004, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2004=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=123&.

⁵¹ Minister of Defence Peter Struck, ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik und die Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausforderungen,’ *Europäische Sicherheit*, 52:1 (2003), pp. 18-25.

⁵² Cf. ‘Sicherheitspolitische Positionen der Bundestagsparteien’.

⁵³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Defence Policy Guidelines,’ p. XX.

⁵⁴ Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed. Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

In the academic discussion, deliberating on appropriate strategies for German security policy is usually not linked to an analysis of threats and the functional imperatives to meet them but embedded into a general exchange of views on German foreign policy as a whole, comprising proponents and critics of a more “assertive” behaviour in the international arena.⁵⁵ There are, in the wake of making the case for a comprehensive approach, two mainstreams in the academic elite when it comes to threat response:

- *Democratization* as a bottom-up response that has both unilateral and multilateral components and is directed to eliminating socio-economic potentials for violent conflict. The democratization approach is broadly seen by the academic elite as suited to meet security threats that have trans-national and global roots or originate from comparatively distant regional sources such as the Greater Middle East.⁵⁶
- *Effective Multilateralism* as top-down response that is directed to setting constraints to escalation and promoting ameliorative conflict transformation. As a rule, the academic elite favours the effective-multilateralism approach as a response to continuing instability in Europe’s rim regions, especially the Southern Balkans.⁵⁷

Interestingly, critical, mostly left wing oriented academics reprimand chancellor Schröder’s proclamation of a “new way” of national self-consciousness and *multinationalism* rather than *multilateralism* in German foreign and security policy. They reject that Germany is “ripe for world politics” and can contribute anything to the EU’s envisaged “effective multilateralism” in preventive diplomacy and peace making.⁵⁸ Remarkably, in a quite similar vein, authors subscribing to the realist school of foreign policy analysis criticize Germany’s self-proclaimed role as a new “Friedensstifter”, who feels itself morally responsible for peace and development in just any corner of the world.⁵⁹

On the side of the informed public, there has been a tendency over the past few years to put the challenge to German foreign and security policy on the spot, thus asking more for unilateral policy change than effective multilateral contributions. The informed public seems to perceive the new security threats as a challenge to conduct a debate on

⁵⁵ Cf. Dirk Peters, ‘The Debate About a New German Foreign Policy After Unification,’ in Volker Rittberger (ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 11-33.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Internationale Politik*, 59:7 (2004), dedicated to “Reforms for the Middle East” and 59:11-12 (2004), dedicated to “Developmental Policy”.

⁵⁷ Cf. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, ‘Konflikte und Konfliktbearbeitung in Südosteuropa (200-2004),’ in Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (ed.), *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen. Ergänzungsband 1* (Hamburg: Mittler, 2004), pp. 137-158; Annegret Bendiek, *Der Konflikt im ehemaligen Jugoslawien und die europäische Integration* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004); Calic, ‘Herausforderung Kosovo’.

⁵⁸ *WeltTrends. Zeitschrift für internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien*, no. 28 (2000).

⁵⁹ Cf. Alexander Siedschlag, ‘Zwischen gezähmter Macht und gefordertem Engagement. Die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik des vereinten Deutschland in ihrer ersten Dekade,’ *Gegenwartskunde*, 49:2 (2000), pp. 143-156.

Germany's position in the world and Germany's weight in international politics. Particular examples of this trend are the recent contributions in the journal *WeltTrends*, discussing the "big power" status and "ripeness for world politics" of the country.⁶⁰ In a similar manner, the national newspapers usually link their security-risk themes to identifying urgent need for action on the government's side in the first place, not for example on the side of the EU.

The government itself, in contrast, its rhetoric of a "German way" notwithstanding, follows its preference for multilateral or multinational responses to threat – bearing in mind that when it comes to meeting hard security threats the menu for strategy choice will need to include military action. In this context, there is not only an ideational but also a pragmatic foundation of Germany's preference for multilateralism in threat response: In its sentence of 1994, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (supreme court) maintained that the German constitution allows for sending Bundeswehr troops abroad, ending a flaming domestic debate about the constitutional foundations for a German contribution to "out of area" operations. However, at the same time, the Bundesverfassungsgericht made it clear that the constitution requires that any international Bundeswehr mission be embedded into an international security system such as the United Nations, NATO or the EU. The Bundesverfassungsgericht thus ruled out any German military engagement within a mere ad hoc coalition of states out of the multilateral framework of a security institution.

Explicitly talking about responses to the "new" security threats, the leaders of the Government have pledged to a multilateral approach: At the Munich Security Conference 2004, for instance, foreign minister Joschka Fischer argued that the terrorist threat could not be met by a coalition of Western states. This in the first place led him to assert a depreciation of transatlantic security multilateralism but then to an imploration of a globally based effective multilateralism to "positively design globalization".⁶¹ At the Munich Security Conference 2005, chancellor Schröder also denied a defining moment of the transatlantic link and NATO in the light of new security threats, at the same time calling for a new, globally linked multilateralism as a response to global risks.⁶² One must not forget, however, that other members of the government such as defence minister Peter Struck strongly favour a continuation of the transatlantic security

⁶⁰ *WeltTrends. Zeitschrift für internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien*, no. 28 (2000) and 43 (2004).

⁶¹ Speech of Joschka Fischer on the Munich Security Conference 2004, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2004=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=123&; see also 'Europa auf der Suche nach politischer Ordnung,' Rede von Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer anlässlich der Eröffnung des International Bertelsmann Forum in Berlin am 09. Januar 2004, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/presse_archiv?archiv_id=5243.

⁶² http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=143&.

multilateralism as a response to threat and a mechanism for stability projection in order to manage sources of threat in the Greater Middle East.⁶³

In the particular field crisis prevention, the government's action plan on "Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation" strongly calls for multilateral approaches as well. However, a tendency towards unilateralism is visible in the parliamentary realm. Interestingly to notice, in the eyes of the CDU/CSU, the prime response to the 21st century's security threats is the strife for immediate German economic recovery, as Angela Merkel explained in her speech at the Munich Security Conference 2005:⁶⁴ Only who showed strong economic growth could exert influence in Europe. According to Merkel, meeting 21st century security threats requires capacity for unilateral action, following two aims. First, to bear the country's share in responsibility for European welfare. Second, to be capable of realizing national interests and build military capacities so to open up for oneself opportunities to design the international security order. Apart from its questionable voluntarism, such an approach seems to tremendously overestimate the possible influence of the policy of one single country in coming to terms with our century's security realm. Though viewing, just as the government does, economic factors as directly affecting the main security threat scenarios, the underlying causal beliefs are opposite.

The government regards economy, such as war economy, often enough as a source of violent conflict and believes that economic measures of the European countries are needed in order to break war-economic cycles of violence as well as to reduce structurally caused underdevelopment as a breeding ground for terrorism. The CDU/CSU sees economy as a tool to meet security threats as well as to claim German influence in the further development of the European security order – which is the classical Christian-party approach to then West-German security policy of the 1950ies.⁶⁵ Looked at on a general level, however, there is a consensus in the Bundestag that German defence and security policy should always be conducted multilaterally –⁶⁶ with, however, somewhat diverging institutional preferences, as will be noted below.

3.2 *Institutional preferences for meeting threats: towards an EU-first approach?*

As seen above, academic as well as daily newspaper contributions define security threats dominantly in terms of global risks that confront nation-state actors with an urgent need to adapt their security policy to meet these risks. The focus is clearly on the challenges to nation-state foreign and security policy, the *Internationale Politik* being more or less the only source that makes connections to institutional change on a

⁶³ Cf. Peter Struck's speech on the Munich Security Conference 2004, entitled 'Future of NATO,' http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2004=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=125&.

⁶⁴ http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_2004=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=145&.

⁶⁵ Cf. Lider, *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought*.

⁶⁶ 'Sicherheitspolitische Positionen der Bundestagsparteien'.

European and global scale. Yet there is no sound debate about institutional preferences in German security policy. Nevertheless, some authors advocate an increased reliance on civil-military cooperation in post-conflict peace building, for typical post-conflict scenarios do not allow for an institutional separation of civil and military action in the field.⁶⁷ Those authors exhibit a clear institutional preference for NGOs, with the military component wherever possible being confined to providing a stable environment for NGO activities.

On the side of the government, with the coming in office of the Red-Green Government in autumn 1998 there came some important change in institutional preferences for meeting security threats. During its first 100 days, the new government had followed the footsteps of its predecessor, the Christian-Liberal coalition under chancellor Helmut Kohl in voicing its support for a European pillar within NATO (that is, a European Security and Defence Identity, or ESDI, within the Atlantic Alliance framework as the first-reference institution to meet security threats).⁶⁸ By the end of 1999, chancellor Schröder declared that the government had almost completely changed its view.⁶⁹ He now argued for confining NATO to providing collective defence and critical military infrastructure. Whereas just in April 1999, NATO member states, which naturally includes Germany, had unanimously agreed on the Alliance's new strategic concept, Schröder now somewhat devalued consultation, crisis management in flexible coalitions and partnership outreach, which belong to the new core functions of the Alliance, in saying that all this should rather be accomplished within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the EU.⁷⁰ On the Munich Security Conference 2005, Schröder even maintained that NATO risked becoming outdated and was "no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies".⁷¹ With this focus on European-only institutions, maybe Germany has actually lived up to Peter Katzenstein's analytical concept of a "tamed power".⁷²

In fact, the government seems to be regarding the ESDP as the first-choice security institution and places it in the normative context of a key project for European unification and building block for a true political union of Europe.⁷³ The central theme of German security multilateralism has thus shifted from a European pillar of NATO to

⁶⁷ E.g. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Tobias Pietz, 'Zivil-militärische Intervention – Militärs als Entwicklungshelfer?,' *Friedensgutachten 2004*, pp. 200-208.

⁶⁸ Cf. Gerhard Schröder's Speech at the Munich Security Conference 1999, reprinted in Horst Teltschik (ed.), *German Security Policy on the Threshold of the 21st Century. Transatlantic Partnership at the Beginning of the Next Millennium – Development of the Asia Pacific Region – Requirements for Future Stability* (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Spitz, 1999).

⁶⁹ Cf. 'Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum bevorstehenden Europäischen Rat in Helsinki am 10./11. Dezember 1999 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 3. Dezember 1999,' in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed.): *Bulletin*, no. 85/1999, pp. 805-808 (p. 807).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_2004=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=143&

Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

⁷³ See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 'Defence Policy Guidelines,' para. 50.

an independent ESDP just “compatible” with NATO.⁷⁴ Rooted in ESDP, the government nevertheless sees the objective of EU-based security multilateralism in a civil-military approach of crisis reaction, which it advocates to comprise cooperative links to other security institutions. This preference for a close combination of civil and military instruments to meet emergent security threats may be the reason for the governmental elite’s shift from NATO to EU preference in crisis response.

Notwithstanding this value-oriented institutional choice, it has to be pointed out that German security policy making now and then suffers from shortsightedness of elites in the governmental body. This is especially true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has taken the position that ESDP should prepare to take over virtually all operational functions from NATO. NATO as a security institution is regarded as restricted to measures of last resort in the case of “genocide” and “humanitarian catastrophes”.⁷⁵ Such an institutional choice is typical of many of the Green party elite, who provide the leading personnel of the Foreign Ministry. They typically fail to appreciate the political structures and functions of the Atlantic Alliance – such as the fact that NATO is the only component of the European security order in whose treaty the member states enter, among others, the commitment to solve international disputes by peaceful means and to strengthen the institutions of democracy.⁷⁶

Corresponding to the government’s perception that considerable security threats result from unhandled conflict potentials and underlying causes of instability, it concedes the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) an important place among international security institutions, contributing 10 per cent of its staff.⁷⁷ It is Germany’s idea that the OSCE become a knowledge base for small arms control and transparency of small arms transfer. As failing democratic and economic transformation in Greater Europe ranks among the governmental perception of immediate security threats, it is logical that Germany sees the Council of Europe also as a security institution in the stricter sense of the word.⁷⁸ Its added value is seen in the setting of normative standards and democratic institution building in the field of civil and human rights in order to safeguard human security in all parts of Europe.

Germany’s institutional choice for meeting threats rising from instability in regions other than Europe or its immediate periphery are so to speak indigenous regional and sub-regional institutions whose “peace capacities” and operational capabilities the Red-

⁷⁴ Alexander Siedschlag, ‘Deutschlands Rolle in der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik,’ in Raimund Krämer and Hans Arnold (eds.), *Sicherheit für das größere Europa. Politische Optionen im globalen Spannungsfeld* (Bonn: Dietz, 2002), pp. 290-310 (p. 305).

⁷⁵ ‘Krisenprävention als Element deutscher Sicherheitspolitik. Rede des Staatsministers im Auswärtigen Amt, Dr. Ludger Volmer, vor dem Journalisten-Seminar der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Berlin, am 30./31. Oktober 2000,’ in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed.): *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 10 (2000), pp. 18-22 (p. 21).

⁷⁶ Articles 2 and 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949.

⁷⁷ Deutsche Bundesregierung (ed.), *Aktionsplan 2004 “Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung”*, p. 28.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

Green government intends to support – for example within the framework of the G8 action plan on Africa.⁷⁹ Germany actively supports the actions plan's purpose to develop inner-African capabilities for crisis management and prevention of violent conflict until 2010 by strengthening regional organizations (such as the Economic Community Of West African States, or ECOWAS) as well as the African Union (AU). Germany here attaches much significance to domestic inter-ministerial activity in support of regional training centres for peacekeeping, such as the *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)* in Accra, Ghana and the *Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC)* in Nairobi, Kenya.

The government sees civil conflict prevention as well as peace consolidation as important strategies for meeting imminent threats, which constitute a broad field of action in which different types of actors should be engaged.⁸⁰ Here, the government lays much emphasis on the role of the United Nations, which it regards as the central place for discussing and coordinating ideas and objectives in international relations and security. From the German point of view, the UN's role in meeting international and global security threats should be expanded from conflict management to conflict prevention and sustainable development of peace processes. In this context, the government places high hopes on an expansion of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which according to its view could be more effectively employed as a means of prevention in failing states. Also the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), from the German point of view, could exhibit more effectiveness as a means to meet security threats: Whereas the government acknowledges its contribution to early warning by identifying and evaluating environmental degradation as potentials for violent conflict, it calls for a stronger emphasis on societal capacity building as a contribution to stabilizing post-conflict settings, especially those where violent conflict has resulted in environmental damage.

Interestingly to notice, the government, however, seems to regard proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as an issue that should be dealt with on the basis of international cooperation rather than within the UN. Only multinational cooperation, in the view of the government, can tackle the core problems in respect of an effective counter-proliferation regime, including the enforcement of legally binding commitments, the strengthening of multilateral agreements, the extension of export controls and the deepening of political dialogue with third countries.⁸¹ The government is also sceptical of sanctions and sets high expectations in international, rather than institutional activity to refine this instrument, make it better mapped-out and embed it in a comprehensive strategy of crisis prevention.⁸²

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-35.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

The majority of the Bundestag is now in favour of German military engagement in multinational frameworks. The government's motion to extend the Bundeswehr's participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and moreover take part in Provincial Reconstruction Teams had no difficulty in passing in September 2004, with Germany now contributing the largest force contingent, that is almost 2.000 troops. The Bundestag has also passed a Forces Deployment Act in December 2004, laying down procedures for deciding about Bundeswehr participation in international peace operations as well as military interventions.

Nevertheless, predominant parliamentary views about security institutional choice do not exactly parallel those of the government:⁸³ The SPD puts EU and NATO first, whereas its coalition partner, the Greens, sees the UN as the prime frame for meeting our century's security threats. Their maxim is that the "coalition" should come to define "mission", which, in their view, can best be put into practice within the UN system. The CDU/CSU, as its leading figure Angela Merkel pointed out on the Munich Security Conference 2005, is in favour of an EU-centered approach backed up by military capabilities in the form of the battle groups but insist on its embeddedness into the transatlantic framework.⁸⁴ The UN as a security actor is currently seen by the CDU/CSU just as a framework for realizing human rights. Former defence minister Volker R  he, member of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party and chairman of the parliament's foreign affairs committee, defended NATO's capability to transform in order to meet new-type security threats against the Schr  der proposals at the Munich Security Conference 2005. Yet he joined Schr  der in questioning the Alliance's core function of coming to common terms in defence and disarmament affairs. For example, he argued that security threats such as Iran's nuclear programme or security policy decisions such as lifting the arms embargo on China were in the first place political issues so that NATO were not a perfect place to handle them.⁸⁵

3.3 *Instrumental preferences for meeting threats: Civilian rhetoric vs. coercive impact?*

Academics like Herfried M  nkler, bandwagoning on the new-wars paradigm,⁸⁶ refute military action as a means to master security threats. In their theoretical concept, war as a means of reducing the complexity of conflict finds itself replaced by the process of peace as a long, painful way to manage territorially based security threats in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the *Friedensgutachten* clearly advocates crisis prevention, namely "strategies of peace": such as nation building including, among others, human rights, women's rights as well democratic security sector reform, backed-up by common actions on the side of the international community in order to strengthen the United

⁸³ 'Sicherheitspolitische Positionen der Bundestagsparteien'.

⁸⁴ http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=145&.

⁸⁵ *EU Observer*, 16.02.2005, <http://euobserver.com/?aid=18420&rk=1>.

⁸⁶ M  nkler, *Die neuen Kriege*.

Nations system, promote international arms control regimes, strengthen the idea of human security and deepen our understanding of economic factors in the protraction of ethno-national conflict and civil wars as well as in the sustainability of post-conflict peace-making.⁸⁷

In contrast, political practice shows a considerable German engagement in coercive instruments of threat management, as a look at the development on the Bundeswehr's participation in international military operations reveals. Multilateralism here seems in fact to have changed from a constraint (in the sense of Germany as a tamed power) to a "strategic enabler".⁸⁸

Table 2: Development of international German force deployments

<i>Name of country and operation</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR/EUFOR)	2800	2000	2000	1600	1321	1110	1090
Georgia (UNOMIG)	9	9	9	11	11	12	11
Afghanistan / Uzbekistan (ISAF)			1200	1200	1200	2350	2190
Eastern Mediterranean (Active Endeavour)			400	400	400	250	
Macedonia (Concordia)			450	600	40		
Djibouti / Horn of Africa (Enduring Freedom)				1200	300	500	510
Kosovo (KFOR)				4700	3326	3250	3250
Kuwait (Enduring Freedom)				238	90		
Congo / Uganda (Artemis)					97		
Sudan (AMIS)						200	
Indonesia (post-Tsunami humanitarian assistance)						120	120
Ethiopia / Eritrea (UNMEE)						2	2
<i>Total number of Bundeswehr troops deployed in the respective year</i>	<i>2809</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2059</i>	<i>9949</i>	<i>6385</i>	<i>7894</i>	<i>7173</i>

Sources: <http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de> (1 April 2005);

http://www.bundeswehr.de/C1256EF4002AED30/Docname/Einsaetze_Home (1 April 2005).

⁸⁷ *Friedensgutachten 2004*, pp. 122-250.

⁸⁸ Klaus Becher, 'German Forces in International Military Operations,' *Orbis*, 48:3 (2004), pp. 397-408 (pp. 404-405).

On the other hand, at the level of strategy and public diplomacy, the instrumental preference is clearly civilian. Government statements now as before subsume security and defence under the umbrella of foreign policy, with the main theme “German foreign policy is peace policy”.⁸⁹ As noted above, the accompanying concept of security is a comprehensive one, including military as well as civilian means of conflict prevention and conflict settlement.⁹⁰ Yet the emphasis unmistakably is on a civilian approach and on prevention of the formation of potentials for violent conflicts as well as for virulent security threats. However, it is clear that from the broad definition of security and means to provide for it, there is little that can be derived when it comes to defining threats to German national security. At the same time, there is little that can be said not to constitute at least an indirect threat to the German idea of peace and a global cooperative security order. Germany’s defining of its own security and security interests in terms of removing obstacles to world peace results in a revival of the dangers of the country overtaxing itself, thus risking a loss of credibility in international security affairs.

Nevertheless, also the instrumental practice of German security policy is now as before a multilateral one. From this core approach derives the interest not to act primarily out of national considerations but to find common international approaches to managing border-crossing problems, to strengthen international institutions and not only recur to them for voicing one’s one position and interests but to define common interests. This security multilateralism centres on the government’s conviction that civil conflict management should rank first in the instruments to meet security threats but that coping with the complexity of conflict constellations on the verge of the 21st century will be too much for any single nation or organization. Therefore, Germany advocates the leading idea of security multilateralism and a security “multidimensionalism” – that is, co-operating with “peace-prepared” actors, namely “peace alliances” in the conflict regions themselves in order to realize a “multi-track” approach to structural prevention of violent conflict.⁹¹ That way, the Red-Green coalition hopes to contribute to dismantle concepts of the “enemy” and to promote intercultural dialogue.

Against this background, the Action Plan 2004 “Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation” defines security policy instruments as instruments of civil conflict prevention and peace consolidation⁹² and sets out the following scope of first-choice instruments⁹³:

⁸⁹ As laid down in the government coalition treaty as well as described on the foreign ministry’s website at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik>.

⁹⁰ As the latest example, see ‘Security Thinking in Comprehensive Terms: Challenges for Crisis Management in the 21st Century – Keynote speech by State Secretary Jürgen Chrobog on the occasion of the opening of the conference on crisis management,’ Berlin, 6 April 2005, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=7035.

⁹¹ Deutsche Bundesregierung (ed.), *Aktionsplan 2004 “Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung”*, pp. 43-45.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp- 36-58.

- Building reliable governmental structures including rule of law, human rights, gender equality, minority protection and freedom of religion.
- Enforcing the rule of law in post-conflict situations as a means of sustainable conflict prevention with respect to failed states.
- Building peace potential in civil society and the media, culture and education sectors.
- Creating peace economies.
- Strengthening the global level of international relations with the United Nations as the core institution.
- Strengthening the regional level in European politics with the European Union as the core institution.

It remains to conclude that there exists a certain gap between growing-scale German military engagement on the one hand and an increasing programmatic impetus towards institution- and nation-building endeavours. This may be a telling illustration of the fact that change in strategic culture does not typically occur the form that one identity or self-image as a security actor replaces the other but that new identities add on to existing ones.⁹⁴

4. Government expenditure on security

The government's strategy of a development- and economic-transformation based approach to combating terrorism and countering asymmetric threats after 9/11 has not exhibited much impact on budgetary allocations in absolute terms. A noticeable relative increase (share of expenditures for economic cooperation and development in the overall federal budget) is only present in the current planning for the 2005. Second, military expenditure remarkably increased in the wake of 9/11 by 20.2 per cent (from 23.3 to 28.0 billion €), levelling out at this sum since then. However, along with the mentioned relative increase of the development budget, the share of the defence budget in the overall federal budget shrank from 9.0 per cent in 2004 to a target value of 7.5 per cent for 2005.

Yet it has to be noted that the government's understanding of Germany as a responsible, sometimes somewhat self-reliant security actor has been visible in budgetary allocations since about one year. The figures support the temporary conclusion that a reallocation of resources from the defence budget to the budget for economic co-operation and development is taking place.

⁹⁴ See Michael Barnett, 'Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change. Israel's Road to Oslo,' *European Journal of International Relations*, 5:1 (1999), pp. 5-36; Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests,' *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:3 (1996), pp. 275-318.

Table 3: Development of annual budgetary allocations for the Ministry of Economic Co-Operation and Development

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>Billion €</i>	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8
<i>Share in the total federal budget (in per cent)</i>	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5	2.2

Sources: Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Finanzplan des Bundes 2003-2007. Berlin 2004; Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Bundeshaushalt 2004. Tabellen und Übersichten. Berlin, November 2003; Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Monatsbericht des BMF Januar 2004; Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Monatsbericht des BMF Februar 2005.

Table 4: Development of annual budgetary allocations for the Ministry of Defence

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>Billion €</i>	24.6	23.3	28.0	28.4	28.3	28.1	27.9
<i>Share in the total federal budget (in per cent)</i>	9.2	9.5	11.5	11.4	11.0	9.0	7.5

Sources: Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Finanzplan des Bundes 2003-2007. Berlin 2004; Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Bundeshaushalt 2004. Tabellen und Übersichten. Berlin, November 2003; Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Monatsbericht des BMF Januar 2004; Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Monatsbericht des BMF Februar 2005

5. Conclusion

Germany's policy follows the perception that in contemporary international politics, there is a sharp dichotomy between security and defence and that it follows the conviction that this dichotomy has to be overcome. Maybe one could say that Germany's paradigm is "security is the best defence". At the same time, Germany tends to exaggerate the scope of the field of security policy, taking security to be the high-valued aim of any prudent policy.⁹⁵ Understanding security in this sense however does neither allow for criteria of success and of the reality-relatedness of a country's security policy, nor does it provide a frame of reference for a systematic choice of instruments. It

⁹⁵ As it seems to be the approach especially of the foreign ministry, cf. 'Security Thinking in Comprehensive Terms.

also precludes any concept for determining when and how a security shortage becomes a threat and requires reaction. In this context, Germany indeed “confounds neorealism”⁹⁶ for it not only bases its policy on the principle of ameliorating the state of the entire international system (“peace policy”) rather than its own position but also resists to reacting to international-structural pressure, instead placing itself under the aegis of ideas.

This aegis of ideas pushes the country into a policy that seeks to link any perceived threat to an underlying evil in the world that results from prevalent injustice or asymmetrical chances for prosperity and development. In this respect, it is undeniable that united Germany has developed an art of declaring “total peace”⁹⁷. For the time being, this seems to be the major tenet of the country’s strategic culture – rather than a general antimilitarism in the sense of Thomas Berger.⁹⁸ Germany thus continues to have special difficulty finding “the right mix between democratic norms, civic standards and historical consciousness on the one hand and a realistic perception of international politics”⁹⁹.

According to John Duffield, we can expect a high influence of national security culture on policy under two conditions:¹⁰⁰ First, in an international setting that is complex and in which strategy decisions are bound to be ambiguous, so that decision-makers need to heavily rely on pre-existent worldviews, styles of perception and standard operating procedures for decision-making. Second, in a domestic or institutional setting in which there are more than a small number of decision makers and where long-term decisions with radiating effects are on the agenda. Given the complex international security agenda on the verge of the 21st century as well as Germany’s moral and political vow for a deepening of European integration also in the defence and security sector, we should expect a further increasing impact of the country’s strategic culture on its policy. Given the normative and global impetus in this “peace policy” culture we should accordingly expect a widening gap between Germany’s moral claims and promises on the one hand and its actual capacity for action on the other.

⁹⁶ John S. Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behavior. Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,’ *International Organization*, 53:4 (1999), S. 765-803.

⁹⁷ Gunther Hellmann, ‘Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany,’ *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40:1 (1996), pp. 1-39.

⁹⁸ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*.

⁹⁹ Reimund Seidelmann, ‘German Foreign Policy and the European Order,’ in Reimund Seidelmann (ed.), *Crisis Policies in Eastern Europe. Imperatives, Problems and Perspectives* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), pp. 235-273 (p. 248).

¹⁰⁰ Duffield, *World Power Foresaken*, pp. 27-28.