Civil-military interaction in EU crisis management
Conceptual underpinnings and policy options towards „CMNEW“

Presentation at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
10 April 2006

Alexander Siedschlag
Starting point

• The European Union describes itself as a global actor to whose USP belongs a determination and capability to devise and perform comprehensive conflict management within and beyond the ESDP framework. This also applies to crisis response and crisis prevention (with the term crisis management covering both dimensions and crisis, for the purpose followed here, defined as violently manifest conflict process)

• The EU expects this comprehensiveness to have positive feedback on its internal consolidation (cf. ESS: more active, coherent, capable and interactive Union)

• Policy analysis and military policy tend to identify two levels on which civil-military interaction is organized within the ESDP context: CMCO (political-strategic level) and CIMIC (tactical-operational level)

• Much as such a clear-cut distinction contributes to prevent conceptual confusion, it misses some EU-typical challenges in civil-military interaction
Foundational ideas and challenges of EU crisis management

- Pillar-overarching endeavour that also requires, e.g., civil-civil co-ordination within the EU system (cf. Council-Commission split)
- Multifunctional crisis management
- Gap between political-strategic crisis management concept (CMC) and in-theatre implementation by mere ad-hoc interlocking needs to be bridged
- **Civil/military** interaction has no fixed interfaces but is multi-dimensional and needs **networking** rather than co-ordination:
### Dimensions/types of actors in civil/military networking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intern (acting in the crisis area)</th>
<th>Civil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>remaining structures of former governmental executive and legislative bodies; newly forming agencies and authorities (e.g. transitory government bodies, committees); local civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regular military forces; irregular forces; warlord troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extern (part of an international intervention of intervening individually)</th>
<th>Civil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>international organisations; mandated NGOs; unmandated NGOs/PVOs; governmental organisations (e.g. USAID)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entry and enabling forces (e.g. NRF, ERRF); coalitions of the willing; international forces deployed on the basis of a UN mandate; international forces deployed at the request of the government of a stabilized de-facto regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (1/5)

- E.g. civil-military end-state oriented practices
  - “The short term aim of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the civilian population and institutions within a commander’s area of operation in order to create the civil/military conditions that offer him the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages.”
  - “The long term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievements of a lasting solution to the crises.”
What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (2/5)

• E.g. strategic/operational culture,

"Further, NATO commanders must take into account the presence of increasingly large numbers of international and non-governmental civilian organisations. These demanding circumstances may be further complicated by difference in culture and mandate between the military and civilian organizations concerned."
What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (3/5)

Civil and military PSO domains and fields of co-ordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil crisis management characteristics</th>
<th>Military crisis management characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>initially dependent on the military providing a secure environment; own contribution to maintaining a secure environment is a follow-up task</td>
<td>providing a secure environment as elementary initial task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decentralized organization and informal co-ordination as operating principles</td>
<td>hierarchical organization as operating principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanity, responsiveness, human-needs-orientation, neutrality – also as principles in order to maintain one’s own security</td>
<td>professionalism and efficiency: universal culture in action and routines, independent of specific conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confrontation avoidance</td>
<td>routine-based acceptance and processing of confrontation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long-term horizon, sustainability</td>
<td>systematic planning, including the formulation of exit strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous standards of success, largely adapted to the situation</td>
<td>exogenous, generalized standards of success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (4/5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems and misfits in civil-military interaction from a civilian point of view</th>
<th>Problems and misfits in civil-military interaction from a military point of view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military interaction should be flexible and adaptable according to changing mission needs</td>
<td>Civil-military interaction should be institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military comprehensiveness in crisis management brings the risk of loosing one’s position as self-relying actor with an own mandate and being degraded to a mere instrument; as a consequence, comprehensiveness should not be followed at a strategic, but at an operational level</td>
<td>Because of its mission to provide a secure environment and comprehensive contingency planning, military actors perform overarching tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military actors often lack commitment for endangered societies; military is rather part of the problem than of the solution</td>
<td>Civil actors do not operate on the basis of clear priorities and follow hidden agendas; co-operating with them amplifies the problem of mission creep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What needs to be co-ordinated in comprehensive crisis management? (5/5)

Reading


What does the EU do? (1/2)

- Commission and Secretariat of the Council envisage a “culture of co-ordination” that primarily refers to making all EU-intern actors work together in all phases of a given crisis and name this “CMCO”. Implementing this culture is more urgent than e.g. defining CIMIC-procedures derived from a CMCs CMCO provisions cf. Council of the European Union: Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO). Brussels, 7. November 2003, 14457/0

- Best practice for devising a tailor-sized (political-strategic) CMC by involving all ESDP bodies: PSC, EUMC, CIVCOM as well as internal stake-holders

- Crisis Response Co-Ordination Teams (CRCTs) to link this process via Secretary General/High Representative of CFSP (SG/HR) to Commission activities

- Open question: locus of control for civil-military interaction at the political-strategic level
What does the EU do? (2/2)

- CMC contains discrete options: civil strategic option (CSO), police strategic option (PSO), military strategic option (MSO), EC Measures
- This leaves it to the PSC to do something like CMNEW at the level of the CONOPS it presents to COREPER/GAERC
- Problem: Elaboration of MSO is largely done by a Crisis Action Team (CAT) in the Council Secretariat, so CMCO with the commission strongly depends on inter-personal interlocking
- Next level for co-ordinating efforts already is the tactical-operational level: EUSR as chairman of an in-operation co-ordinating group whose advice to take into account the Force Commander is requested
- Only civil heads of mission report to PSC via EUSR so that he can report to SG/HR
- How then can CRCT “assist in ensuring full coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the EU action in the implementation phase”?
How does the EU do? (1/2)

Example of a frame of reference: EUMC assessment/benchmarks


• CMCO is the implementation of comprehensive crisis management
• CMCO is an overarching task that needs to be accomplished at each step of a crisis in its whole range
• CMCO therefore includes co-ordination within the EU and with third actors
• CMCO would require common civil-military planning, doctrine development, training, networked early warning, civil-military information management etc.
My conclusions from this are:

- CMCO needs to be generalized and detached from CMCs
- When discussion models for civil-military interaction, we need to make the conceptual step from rather case-by-case, environmentally conditioned CMCO (political-strategic) and CIMIC (operational) to **systematic civil-military net-working (“CMNEW”)**
- Wide range of models is available which the EU should carefully examine
What would the EU need? (1/3)

- EU needs to re-interpret its decision-autonomy approach and closer look into existing CMNEW-suited concepts
- EU needs to appreciate that CMCO and CIMIC should be *vertically integrated* into a CMNEW approach
- CMNEW is a *complex management task* and not merely a matter of CMC and tactical doctrine
What would the EU need? (2/3)

CMNEW as a complex management task involves

- matching available ESDP instruments, other EU instruments and third-party instruments with a civil-military end-state strategy – in a way that is flexible enough to meet operational requirements and universal enough to help enact the Union’s guiding norms (e.g. as defined in the ESS)

- civil-military, military-military and civil-civil interaction – both within in EU system and “combined”

- following principles comparable to those of network-centric operations: Increase the effects of existing single potentials and instruments, rather than increasing the amount of potentials and instruments
What would the EU need? (3/3)

- acknowledging that we typically will not be in a position to choose one or the other model for civil-military interaction but have to consider the co-operative culture a work in the field
- understanding and communicating civil-military interaction as an ingredient of any successful PSO, not merely as a technical instrument etc.
- appreciating that civil-military interaction needs to be vertically integrated to let it contribute to the paradigm of transformation:
  - There is no sustainable SSR without a vertically integrated plan for CMNEW in PSOs
  - There is no sustainable CIMIC without common decision-making procedures, that is political-military transformation defined in a CMC or, better, Common Strategy
Some of the identified concepts of CMNEW-value

1. Nordic CMCO
2. CMCoord
de-linking civil and military components so to create a humanitarian space
3. HQ-based CIMIC-groups
CIMIC personell (dual experts) located at the strategic-operational level
4. ZMZ (Bw)
in-operation functional specialists, homeland-security use
5. NRF model
militarily framed multi-national civil-military component system, cf. EUSEC DR Congo
6. Integrated approach
domestic agency networking (“military forces work with their national counterparts”), cf. GB,
CPA (DK – horizontal and vertical networking!), START (CA)…; institutional memory and information sharing; however:
gain of coherence rather at the national than the EU level
7. Multi-national joint planning
8. SHIRBRIG
role of SRSG, combination of operational diversification and informational co-ordination designed for initial entry and
enabling forces
CMNEW: towards a definition

Starting point for a definition of CMNEW could be „Nordic CMCO“ as exemplified by NO-MOE/NORADs TfP in Africa. TfP co-operates with ACCORD, NUPI and ISS

„The success of modern peace operations depend on the effective coordination and synchronization of various functions, organizations and disciplines – providing a safe & secure environment, negotiating a comprehensive political settlement, embarking on a political transformation process including perhaps a new constitution and establishing new political institutions, organising an election, the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, re-establishing the state infrastructure, re-establishing essential services, security sector reform, justice sector reform, reconstruction of physical infrastructure, etc. […] Coordination occurs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and all the various components are involved.“ (http://www.trainingforpeace.org/themes/civmil.htm)

TfP: Training for Peace Programme
NORAD: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ACCORD: African Centre for Constructive Resolutions of Disputes (ACCORD)
NUPI: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
Conclusion/outlook

- CMNEW is vertical, horizontal and multi-level
- CMNEW needs to be a political strategy as opposed to a political label
- CMNEW’s added value needs to be clearly defined and verifiable
- CMNEW is already a task for prevention and must not only enter the agenda on the stage of an approaching intervention
- In the final analysis, CMNEW must be capable of including local actors, which also applies to warlords and irregular forces
- CMNEW should follow Huntington’s principle of “objective civilian control”, i.e. not blur the lines between peace-engineering and military professionalism: Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. […] The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism”.

Thank you and see you!

Security in an Era of Transformation
Politics, Management and Research
29 September – 1 October 2006
Full Programme and Registration at
www.esci.at